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Is Stock a Security? A Criticism of the
Sale of Business Doctrine in Securities
Fraud Litigation
By BARBARA BLACK-

INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding the statutory definitions of a security,t all of which
*Assistant Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A. 1970, Barnard
College; J.D. 1973, Columbia University.
I The term "security" is defined in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) as:
[AJny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate
of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). "Security" is defined in § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) as:
[AJny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but
shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976). Both definitions are preceded by the introductory
phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires."
Despite differences in the statutory language, it is accepted that the provisions should
be construed equivalently. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
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expressly include stock, a majority of the courts recently considering the
question have held that, in many instances, the sale of shares in closely
held corporations 2 is not a sale of securities for the purpose of asserting
private claims under the federal securities laws. 3 Both federal and state
Thirty-four states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have adopted substantially the Uniform Securities Act. The Act defines a "security" as:
[A)ny note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharigg agreement; collateral-trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription;
transferable share; investment contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate
of deposit for a security; certificate of interest or participation in an oil,
gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a
title or lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing. "Security" does not include any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an insurance
company promises to pay a fixed number of dollars either in a lump sum
or periodically for life or for some other specified period.
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(1), 7A U.L.A. 628 (1978).
There has been considerable cross-pollination between the state and the federal definitions both in drafting the statutes and in interpreting them. [d., Commissioners' note
at 631.
2 Closely held, or close, or closed corporations, often referred to as incorporated partnerships, have no precise definition. For a legislative attempt, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 342 (1974). The principal characteristics of close corporations are generally
thought to include: a small number of stockholders, no ready market for the stock, and
substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578,
586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
] The principal federal regulatory provisions are § 5 of the Securities Act, requiring
registration of securities offered to the public, § 17(a) of the Securities Act, prohibiting
fraud in the offer and sale of securities, and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule
10b-5 thereunder, prohibiting fraud in the purchase and sale of securities.
Typically, initial issuances of securities in closely held corporations would be exempt
from the § 5 registration requirements as "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering," under 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976). Subsequent transfers would be exempt from registration as transactions not involving an underwriter, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1976). But see Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980)
(sale of hockey team's stock to its coach and his wife not exempt from registration);
Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978) (sale of two unique notes to one
investor not exempt from registration). Securities transactions which are exempt from
registration under Securities Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976), are not exempted from 1
the antifraud provisions of either the Securities or the Exchange Act. Securities Act, §
17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Exchange Act, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
Thus, subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims under those provisions does not
depend on registration but does depend, inter alia, on whether the transaction involves
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the offer, purchase, or sale of a security.
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange . . . . To use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 1942, states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any persons, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). Federal courts have consistently implied a private cause
of action under Rule 10b-5, beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D: Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court first acknowledged existence of a
private claim in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). The Supreme Court has not decided whether there is a
private right of action implied under § 17(a). The circuit courts of appeals are split on
this issue. The most recent and comprehensive analysis is found in Landry v. All
American Assur. Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit held, based on
Supreme Court precedent, that no private claim should be implied. The court acknowledged that its holding was a minority view, but noted that few courts had analyzed the
issue in depth. Accord Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Contra Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers
II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Heber, 604 F.2d
1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 1979); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir.
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courts· have so concluded, principally based on their analysis of the
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir.
1975) (private right of action exists). See generally Scholl & Perkowski, An Implied

Right of Action Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court Has Said "No," But Is
Anybody Listening?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 41 (1981).
While it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will infer additional private rights
of action from the texts of the securities laws, see note 10 and accomanying text infra,
most complaints which include a § 17(a) claim also state a Rule 10b-5 claim and the
issue therefore is largely academic. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 40.1 F.2d 833, 867
(2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Many
courts, finding that the plaintiff has a claim under Rule 10b-5, do not reach the question of an implied remedy under § 17(a). See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
National Student Mktg., Inc., 650 F.2d 342, 350 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 954 (1981).
The Supreme Court recently decided that an implied remedy exists under Rule lObS for purchasers who have an express remedy under § 11 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1976), because the purchased securities were issued pursuant to a registration statement filed under § 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
State securities regulatory schemes vary. As of 1976, 45 jurisdictions required registration of securities or required selling broker-dealers to file information on securities.
See generally L. LOSS, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 39 (1976).
For the variety of antifraud provisions, see id. at 6-8. Discussion of the effect of the sale
of business doctrine on state securities laws is outside the scope of this Article.
• Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982), discussed in notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra; Kaye v. Pawnee Constr. Co., 680 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1982);
King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654
F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981), discussed in notes 51-58 and accompanying text infra;
Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977); Goodman v. DeAzoulay, No.
81-2550 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1983) (available on LEX IS, Fedsec library, Courts file);
C.P. Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., No. 80-C-2476 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1982;) (available
on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F.
Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982); Kane v. Fischbach, [Current Developments) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,608 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1982);
Kasch Enter. v. Soren, No. 79-C-2661 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1981) (available on LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Courts file); Libco Corp. v. Dusek, No. 77-C-4386 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
1981) (available on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file); Reprosystem v. SCM Corp.,
522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State
Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suozzo, 510 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Barsy v.
Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Ellis v. Henderson, [1980 Transfer Binder)
FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 11 97,722 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 1980); Dueker v. Turner,
[1979-80 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 97,386 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 28,
1979); Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,964
(D. Colo. May 13, 1977); Howard v. Chrysler Corp., [1981-82 Transfer Binder) FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,306 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 1977); Fox v. Ehrmantraut, 28 Cal.
3d 127,615 P.2d 1383, 167 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1980); Tech Resources, Inc. v. Estate of
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United States Supreme Court's decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. 5
The conclusion that stock is not a security not only ignores the literal
meaning of the federal securities statutes, but also marks a drastic departure from the views generally accepted prior to Forman. Until Forman it was well established that transfers of stock in closely held corporations were transactions involving securities and, as such, were subject
to federal securities laws. 6 Indeed, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co./
the first case to imply a private cause of action under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-S of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), involved the buyout of
a fifty percent shareholder group in a close corporation by the other
fifty percent shareholder group.
Courts occasionally expressed discomfort with this view,s but it was
not until the Seventh Circuit's 1981 decision in Frederiksen v.
Polowai that it became widely accepted that transfers of stock in
Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583,272 S.E.2d 314 (1980); Kaiser v. Olson, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1008,
435 N.E.2d 113 (1982).
'
Other courts have either rejected the sale of business doctrine outright or questioned
its validity. See Cole v. PPG Indus., 680 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas
law); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), discussed in notes 66-77 and
accompanying text infra; Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.),
rert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), discussed in notes 78-83 and accompanying text
infra; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.
1974) (pre-Forman); Stacey v. Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Sterling Recreation Org. v. Segal, 537 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1982); Alna
Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Mifflin Energy
Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc. v.
Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
5 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
• See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960): rert. denied, 365
U.S. 870 (1961); Errion v. Carroll, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Frau v. Robinson,
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
7 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
8 See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 n.3 (3d Cir. 1979) (although not
wholly persuaded that regulation of close corporations was intended by Congress, court
felt bound by literal reading of statute and governing precedent); Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir.), rert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004
(1967) (court questioned application of securities laws to sale of business, but dismissed
case because of expired statute of limitations); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F.
Supp. 539, 543-44 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (court considered sale of busi'ness doctrine, but
rejected it); see also 1 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 458-60 (1961); 4 L. LOss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 2489-91 (1969).
• 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), rert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). The widespread
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closely held corporations were, under the sale of business doctrine, not
subject to federal securities laws.
The issue of whether stock is a security typically involves the sale of
all the corporate stock of an active, closely held business to an individual or corporation that takes over the operation of the business. The
disappointed purchaser may subsequently bring an action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, alleging fraudulent
statements or omissions in connection with the sale of the stock. Courts
that have adopted the sale of business doctrine have reasoned that, since
the plaintiff purchased an ongoing business and took over its operation,
the transaction did not involve an investment decision and was not a
securities transaction. The purchasers' suits are thus dismissed for lack
of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Lower federal courts apparently
are striving to expand upon the Supreme Court's dual policies of denying relief to many securities plaintiffs lO and, toward that end, of devisacceptance of the sale of business doctrine is discussed in part II infra.
Commentary generally approves of the sale of business doctrine. See Seldin, When
Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 37 BUS. LAW. 637 (1982); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security:
Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Securities Transaction, 57
N.Y.V. L. REV. 225 (1982); Note, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase of
Corporate Stock; An Argument for Exclusion from Federal Securities Regulations, 8
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 295 (1980); Note, Securities Regulation - Is Stock a Security?,
30 KAN. L. REV. 117 (1981); Comment, The Sale of a Close Corporation Through a
Stock Transfer: Covered by the Federal Securities Laws?, 11 SETON HALL L. REV.
749 (1981). But see Dillport, Restoring Balance to the Definition of Security, 10 SEC.
REG. L.J. 99 (1982).
Mr. Seldin approves of the doctrine because it enhances the attractiveness of a stock
transaction by providing relief from the burdens of federal securities regulation. Seldin,
supra, at 637. Professor Thompson argues that there are distinctions between state and
federal fraud and that Congress intended the securities laws to reach only those transactions in need of special federal protection. Federal protection is needed only when the
purchaser becomes a passive investor in an enterprise. Thompson, supra, at 242-44. In
contrast, Professor Dillport asserts that Congress deliberately drafted an overinclusive
definition of security to provide protection against fraud. Dillport, supra, at 122-28.
10 The Supreme Court's effort to reduce the number of securities cases in federal
courts is manifested by decisions in three substantive areas of securities law. First, the
Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of federal securities jurisdiction by finding that
certain types of instruments, e.g., stock in housing cooperatives, employees' pension
plans, certificates of deposit in federally regulated banks, are not "securities." See notes
20-37 and accompanying text infra. Second, the Court has narrowed the reach of Rule
10b-5 by holding that: (a) the plaintiff must be a purchaser or a seller of securities,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 V.S. 723 (1975); (b) the defendant must
have acted with scienter, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 V.S. 185 (1976); (c) the
misconduct must involve deception or manipulation, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
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ing rules to weed out at early stages of litigation, plaintiffs who do not
assert what the courts feel sure will turn out to be meritorious Rule
10b-S claims.
This Article criticizes the use of the sale of business doctrine in securities fraud litigation. The Article first discusses the Supreme Court's
efforts at defining a security, from its early investment contract analysis
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,.· to Forman and other recent opinions.
Part II analyzes the leading federal cases on the sale of business doctrine and examines problems in applying the doctrine. Next, part III
examines alternative bases, within established Rule 10b-S jurisprudence, for dismissing the claims of purchasers of stock in close corporations. Finally, the Article asserts that, because the sale of business doctrine is inconsistent with congressional intent and is an improper
solution to problems that exist in Rule lOb-S practice, it should be re430 U.S. 462 (1977); and (d) when the alleged misconduct involves nondisclosure, the
defendant must have had a duty to disclose, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980). Third, the Court has reduced the number of private suits that can be brought
by refusing to imply additional private causes of action. Compare Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), with Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979), Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
In narrowing the scope of Rule 10b-5, the Court has relied on the following policy
considerations:
1. "[LJitigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree
and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general." Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 739. This may give even the flimsiest case a substantial settlement value. Id. at
740.
2. The Court is reluctant to create a federal claim when it is "unnecessary to ensure the
fulfillment of Congress' purposes," Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477; when it would
serve "at best a subsidiary purpose" of the federal legislation, id. at 478, or when the
cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state law . . . ." Iii. "Absent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion
of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." Id. at 479. Finally, in the area of implying federal causes of action under the securities laws, the
Court has moved away from its early willingness to imply causes of action, to an unwillingness to do so without arguably clear congressional intent to create a private federal claim. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). For a
recent and rare implication of a private remedy in a federal statutory scheme, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (private party
may maintain action for damages caused by violation of Commodity Exchange Act).
See generally Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981).
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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jected by the courts.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND
ECONOMIC REALITIES

The United States Supreme Court has analyzed the definition of a
security eight times since 1943. 12 In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., U the
Court enunciated the investment contract test for defining a security. It
used the statutory phrase "investment contract" to expand the definition of security to include unconventional instruments not within the
traditional types of securities expressly enumerated in the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act) or the Exchange Act. In United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, \4 the Court emphasized that "economic
realities" must be examined and applied in connection with the Howey
investment contract test, and narrowed the definition of security to exclude an instrument denominated stock, notwithstanding the express inclusion of stock in the statutory definitions. The Court has continued to
constrict the definition in its most recent decisions in this area, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Danieps and Marine Bank v.

Weaver. 16
A.

SEC v. Howey: The Investment Contract Test

In Howey, the SEC sought to enjoin defendants from offering and
selling unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 of the Securities
Act. \1 Defendants offered vacationers in Florida a strip of a citrus grove
along with a service contract for the cultivation and marketing of the
fruit. The district court found, and the appeals court agreed, that there
was no security involved, because the purchase of land and the arrangement of services were two separate transactions.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that these transactions constituted an "investment contract," one form of security in the Securities
12 Chronologically, the eight cases are: SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202
(1967); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551 (1979); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946) .
.. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
IS 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
16 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
17 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976); see note 3 supra.
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Act. The Court noted that the purchasers were vacationing business
and professional people who were told that investment in a grove was
not feasible unless service arrangements were made. The service contract had a binding term of ten years and gave the owners no right to
enter their land to pick fruit without the company's consent. In addition, the owners had no right to specific fruit, and were entitled only to
allocable portions of the net profits from the entire grove. 18 The Court
focused on the sales pitch and the audience at which it was directed,
and found that an investment contract existed because the plan constituted "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or third party."19

B.

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman: The Economic
Realities Approach

Plaintiffs in Forman lived in a state subsidized, nonprofit housing
cooperative. They brought a class and derivative action against the developers of the cooperative and others, alleging violations of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the
Exchange Act. The Supreme Court held that shares of stock which entitled the purchaser to lease an apartment in the cooperative were not
securities. The Court rejected the view that, because the shares were
labelled stock, they must be' considered securities because the statutory
definition includes "any stock."20 Instead, the Court determined that
Congress intended not a literal approach,21 but an examination of the
"economic' realities."22 The Court did suggest that the literal approach

I. SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).
Id. at 299.
19

See note'j

supra.
The Court stated:
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the
Acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities
to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect
the interests of investors. Because securities transactions are economic' in
character Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the
economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
22 The "economic realities" approach was not new, as the Court noted. It originated
in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), the first Supreme Court
opinion to consider the definitional issue, and runs through SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
20

21
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might be appropriate in certain cases to prevent disappointment of a
purchaser's reasonable expectation that the federal securities laws were
applicable:
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not disfXJsitive, we
do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the decision whether it
is a security. There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume
that the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when
the underlying transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics
typically associated with the named instrument. 21

The Court believed, however, that the purchasers of the cooperative's
stock could not have been so misled. First, they were purchasing stock
to acquire a place to live; second, their stock lacked the characteristics
traditionally associated with stock, such as the right to dividends, the
right to vote, negotiability, the ability to be pledged or hypothecated,
and the potential for appreciation in value. 24
The Court also held that the shares were not securities included
within the catch-all statutory language, "in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.' "25 The Court stated that the
Howey investment contract test 26 "embodies the essential attributes that
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."27
328 U.S. 293 (1946), and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Joiner and
Tcherepnin, however, both strongly suggest that the economic realities approach should
not exclude from the definition of securities instruments explicitly enumerated as securities in the statute. Thus, in Joiner, the Court stated that "[i)nstruments may be included within any of these definitions, as [a) matter of law, if on their face they answer
to the name or description." 320 U.S. at 35t. The Court's approach remained consistent with that view in Tcherepnin, in which it said that an instrument denominated a
stock certificate would be deemed a security at least so long as profits are distributable
through dividends, 389 U.S. at 339. In Forman, on the other hand, the Court dismissed
the above language as dicta and emphasized the theme of economic realities found in
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298, and in Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336. United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,849-50 (1975).
21 421 U.S. at 850-5t.
2' Id. at 85t.
2' See note 1 supra.
2. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
27 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). In contrast, the
Court in Tcherepnin gave independent consideration and weight to each of the definitional terms used in the statute. The Court thus believed that the withdrawable savings
and loan association capital shares could be considered as anyone of the following:
investment contract, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, stock, or transferable share. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 336, 339 (1967).
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Post-Forman Opinions

Two Supreme Court opinions after Forman have likewise declined to
view the definition of a security expansively. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,28 the Court held that an employee's interest in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not a security
for two reasons. First, the Court reiterated its earlier language narrowing the scope of Rule 10b-5: "The starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself,"29 and noted that the
definitions of security in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
did not specifically include employee pension plans, despite their widespread use at the time the statutes were enacted. 30 The Court then focused on the Howey/Forman investment contract/economic realities
test and found that there was no investment of money in a common
enterprise and no expectation of profits from the efforts of others. 31
439 U.S. 551 (1979).
,. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979). This sentence has appeared in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975).
10 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,558 (1979). In Interpretative Release No. 33-6188, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 1051 (Feb. 1, 1980) the
SEC staff analyzed Daniel and determined that employee benefit plans which were
both voluntary and contributory for participating employees were subject to the registration requirements and the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act. Registration,
however, would in most instances be required, under the stairs interpretation of the
Securities Act's § 3(a)(2) exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976), only when the plan
invests in the employer's own securities in an amount greater than that contributed to
the plan by the employer. In Interpretative Release No. 33-6281, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP.
11 1052 Van. 15, 1981), the staff confirmed this view. Notwithstanding the SEC's view,
lower courts have extended the Daniel rationale to exclude interests in voluntary and
contributory plans from the definition of securities. Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
686 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982); Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 545'F. Supp. 94 (D.
Hawaii 1982); O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Md. 1982); Tanuggi
v. Grolier, Inc. 471 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Newkirk v. General Elec. Co.,
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 97,216 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
1979).
11 The plaintiff in Daniel had argued that part of his total employment compensation was invested in the fund. The Court found this insufficient to meet the Howey
investment-of-money test. What Howey contemplated was a "specific consideration"
given up in exchange for an interest that had the characteristics of a security. In contrast, the purported investment in Daniel was a relatively insignificant part of the employee's total and indivisible compensation package. Applying Forman's "economic realities," it was clear to the Court that plaintiff was working to earn his living, not to
make an investment in the future. 439 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff also argued that he expected to receive profits upon retirement ~rom the plan managers' skill in investing the
28
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While the principal basis for the Daniel holding was thus a ringing
affirmation of Forman's economic realities test, the Court in Daniel
nevertheless employed two inconsistent methods of interpreting the statutory definition. The Court first examined the language of the statute
and found that pension plans were not explicitly included. But then,
quoting from Howey, it stated that the substance, or economic realities,
of the transaction outweighed the import of the names given to the
instruments.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,12 the latest Supreme Court opinion on
the definitional issue, plaintiffs purchased a certificate of deposit from
defendant bank and subsequently pledged it to the bank to guarantee a
loan made by the bank to a third party. The borrowers in turn agreed
to give plaintiffs fifty percent of their business' net profits. The borrowers went bankrupt, and plaintiffs sued the bank under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. The Court held that neither the conventional certificate of deposit from a federally regulated bank nor the agreement
which gave plaintiffs fifty percent of the net profits of the borrowers'
business was a security.
The Court found that the certificate of deposit was not a security
principally because it was issued by a federally regulated bank. 3l The
plaintiffs assumed virtually no risk of nonpayment, unlike holders of
other forms of long-term debt instruments. Accordingly, the Court concluded, there is no need to include transactions involving these instrufund's assets. This argument failed on two grounds. First, under the Court's view,
plaintiff's concept of "profit" was faulty, since it was based on his assertion that he had
in fact contributed part of his compensation to the fund, with his ultimate receipt of
more than he gave representing profit. The Court found that plaintiff made no identifiable contribution. Second, the Court found that the fund's dependence on earnings from
its assets was not substantial because the bulk of the fund's income came from the
participating employers' contributions. Accordingly, plaintiff's expectation of profits
rested not on the managers' investment acumen, but on the continued increase in employers' contributions, over which the fund managers had no control. In this regard, the
Court noted that the biggest risk to plaintiff's receipt of the benefits was not the fund's
mismanagement of its assets, but his own inability to meet the fund's eligibility requirements. 439 U.S. at 562.
32 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
33 The Court made reference to its decision in Daniel and to the extensive federal
regulation of pension plans by ERISA. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558 n.7.
The Court distinguished the certificate of deposit from the withdrawable capital shares
of a savings and loan association found to be securities in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332 (t 967). Because holders of the latter instruments received dividends based on
the association's profits and had voting rights, the withdrawable capital shares were
much more like "the ordinary concept of a security" than was the certificate of deposit.
455 U.S. at 557.
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ments within the scope of transactions subject to securities regulation.
The Court's analysis of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the
borrowers is more significant. The Third Circuit had emphasized that
the agreement gave the plaintiffs a share of the profits in the borrowers'
business and therefore embodied the elements of the classic Howey investment contract. 14 Without analyzing whether the Howey test had in
fact been satisfied,H the Court determined that the profit-sharing arrangement was not sufficient to make the agreement a security. The
agreement was not within the "ordinary concept of security"36 because
there were no offers made to a number of potential investors, and no
instruments were created that could have been valued by the marketplace and traded publicly.37 Instead, the agreement was a privately negotiated transaction, with unique features that made it an inappropriate instrument for trading. Accordingly, the Court found that it was not
a security.

D.

Conclusion and Forecast

Apparently, the Court is looking for one test to determine what is a
security. Thus far, the Court's emphasis has been on the investment
contract test of Howey.38 It is equally apparent, however, that developing a single test has proved elusive. 39 The Howey test presents difficulties; Forman and Daniel make that clear. The failing of the Howey
" Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982) ..
lS The Court did, however, note that "the provision that the Weavers [plaintiffs)
could veto further loans gave them a measure of control over the operation of the [business) not characteristic of a security." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560. Many
senior securities give the holder such forms of negative control over the issuer; yet their
status as securities for purposes of federal securities regulation has not been questioned.
16 Id.
In Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), the Court stated that the ability to
be traded in a marketplace is not a critical factor in determining the existence of a
security. 389 U.S. at 343, 345. In Weaver, however, the Court emphasized the unique
nature of the agreement, the private negotiations, and the agreement's inability to be
traded publicly in finding that the profit-sharing agreement was not a security. 455
U.S. at 560. There is, of course, a distinction between the withdrawable capital share
in Tcherepnin and the agreement in Weaver. In the former, it was certainly possible
for a trading market to exist; indeed, such shares apparently were traded for a brief
time on a regional stock exchange. 389 U.S. at 345 n.34. In Weaver, on the other hand,
it is hard to imagine this sort of profit-splitting agreement being traded publicly.
31 See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
19 See Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Security," 14 REV. SEC. REG. 981
(1981).
)7
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investment contract test, in the view of the Court, is that it is potentially too inclusive!O Thus, the Court melded to it the economic realities
approach of Forman and Weaver, which may be stated as, "in view of
the economic realities, does it look, feel or smell like a security?"
Forman and Weaver set forth various factors of economic reality to
be considered. First, securities generally have certain characteristics
such as the ability to be negotiated, pledged, or hypothecated, and carry
certain accoutrements, such as the rights to vote and receive dividends!1
Second, securities can be traded in the marketplace,42 and a correlative
factor is the market's ability to fix an objectively ascertainable value to
the instrument. 43 Third, if there is no other regulatory scheme that
more appropriately provides coverage for transactions involving this instrument,44 then the instrument is more likely to be a security.
The Court, however, may not be entirely comfortable with its pragmatic approach, which would eliminate from the definitional sections of
.0 Ironically, many commentators have criticized the Howey test as being too narrow. See, e.g., Carney & Fraser, Defining a "Security": Georgia's Struggle with the
"Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73 (1981); Coffey, The Economic Realities of a
"Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367
(1967); Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 219 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return
"Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
135 (1971). Some state courts have adopted a "risk capital" test to remedy one significant limitation of the investment contract approach: the requirement of profits. The
classic exposition of the risk capital theory is Justice Traynor's opinion in Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), in
which the sale of memberships to finance construction of a country club to be run for
profit was found to contravene California's securities law. In analyzing the statute,
Justice Traynor noted that its definition included noninterest bearing debt instruments
and concluded that:
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of
what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford
those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their
capital in one form or another.
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. The Supreme Court has not
passed on the question of whether the risk capital test is to be used in federal courts,
United Hous. Found" Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,857 n.24 (1975). See Comment,
The Federal Definition of a Security-An Examination of the "Inve~tment Contract"
Concept and the Propriety of a Risk Capital Analysis Under Federal Law, 12 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 911 (1981).
" United Hous. Found., Inc.v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,851 (1975).
" Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982).
" Id.
.. Id. n.7.
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the statutes all words other than "investment contract." While the
Court made clear in both Forman and Weaver that finding an instrument to be a security is not mandated merely by its inclusion among
those expressly denominated securities in the Acts, the Court began its
analysis in DanieJ by noting that pension plans were not included in
the statutory definition. In addition, strict adherence to a pragmatic approach here contrasts sharply with th~ Court's approach in other areas
of securities law, in which the Court has significantly reduced the scope
of regulation by substantial reliance on legislative intent as divined
from the statutory language. 45
Looking only at these opinions, can one forecast the Court's response
to the sale of business doctrine enunciated in Frederiksen v. Poloway?
Under Howey, it is clear that stock held by the 'manager of the business, typically the sole shareholder in a close corporation, does not meet
the Howey investment contract test. There is no common enterprise
when all the stock is held by one person 46 and there is no expectation of

4'

See note 10 and and text accompanying note 30 supra,
.. Judicial examination of Howey's common enterprise requirement has arisen principally in cases involving pyramid schemes and discretionary trading accounts. The issue has been whether horizontal commonality is required under the Howey test or
whether vertical commonality suffices. The distinction can be illustrated by comparing
an investor who buys into a mutual fund with an investor who opens a discretionary
trading account with his broker. In the former case, the investor's contribution is pooled
with other contributions and is jointly invested by the manager; his return is a pro rata
share of the profits made by the manager on the pooled fund. His fortunes, therefore,
are in common with all other investors in the mutual fund, and there is horizontal
commonality. In the latter case, while the broker-dealer may manage numerous discretionary trading accounts, there is no commingling of the accounts. The fortunes of any
individual investor remain separate from those of any other investor, and the common
thread is supplied by the broker-dealer; hence vertical commonality. Compare Hirk v.
Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Wasnowic v.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa., 1972), aFrd mem., 491 F.2d 752
(3d Cir. 1973) (requiring horizontal commonality), with SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473 (5th Cir. 1974); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N,Y. 1979) (vertical
commonality sufficient).
The Ninth Circuit has held that although vertical commonality can satisfy the common enterprise requirement, there is no common enterprise in a discretionary trading
account unless there is some direct relation between the success or failure of the broker
and that of the investor. Discretionary accounts therefore ordinarily will not be securities, since the broker will profit from his commissions even though the investor's account suffers losses. Meyer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc.,
686 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982), appeal filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1983)
(No. 82-1195); Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1982).
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profits from the efforts of others, since the shareholder is managing the
corporation. Thus, if the Howey test is the exclusive test, the Court
will accept the sale of business doctrine, and hold that stock is not a
security.
The Forman opinion is subject to two interpretations. On one hand,
Forman supports a distinction between an interest in a corporation
formed to engage in business, the most traditional form of stock, and
shares in a housing cooperative, which are more commonly viewed as
interests in real property. Moreover, corporate stock generally has all of
the traditional characteristics associated with stock!7 Accordingly, then,
one might conclude that Forman dictates no further scrutiny and that
only corporate stock is a security. On the other hand, Forman also
seemed to say that the investment contract analysis is the exclusive test,
and that even if corporate stock is commonly known as a security, it is
not a security unless it meets the Howey investment contract test.48
DanieJ and Weaver support the view that stock in close corporations
is a security. First, Daniel reintroduced examination of the statutory
language. Second, DanieJ and Weaver emphasized the existence of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for the instruments involved in those
cases; there is no comparable federal regulation for transactions in stock
in closely held corporations. Third, Weaver's emphasis on the ordinary
concept of a security would also seem to militate against acceptance of
the sale of business doctrine. Stock in closely held corporations does not
present the obstacles to public trading posed by the profit-sharing
agreement in Weaver. As one commentator has stated, such stock is
"waiting in the wings of the markets":49 the manager of the corporation
can, at any time, make a public offering of his stock to bring in passive
investors and create a public trading market for the stock. Thus, under
Daniel and Weaver the Court might reject the sale of business doctrine.
Finally, if the Court has the ideal of a unitary test, the sale of business doctrine would be repugnant to that ideal. This is because it neces., Shareholders in close corporations often restrict by contract the right to trade and
pledge their stock. Many close corporations also do not pay dividends on their common
stock, but distribute cash to their shareholders as salaries. This is because dividends
must be paid from the corporation's after-tax dollars and are taxed once again when
received by shareholders, whereas salaries are deductible from the corporation's income
and are taxed only once, when received by the employee. See B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 111.03 (4th
ed. 1979) .
• 1 Sec text accompanying notes 25-27 supra .
• 9 FitzGibbon, What is a Security? A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 918 (1980).
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sarily results in an instrument being a security in some transactions,
but not in others, depending upon whether the parties intended to
transfer control of a' closely held corporation.

II.

THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE

Most courts that have considered the sale of business doctrine 50 have
adopted the broader ruling of Forman and held that stock in closely
held corporations is not a security if the purchaser assumes control of
the enterprise. The courts have read Forman to require application of
the Howey investment contract test and, applying the test, have found
that no security was involved 'In the transaction. Further, they have
found that the economic realities are that the purchaser is acquiring a
business, not investing in securities. In other words, it is a commercial
transaction, not an investment.

A.

Frederiksen v. Poloway

The leading case espousing the sale 'of business doctrine is Frederiksen v. Poloway.51 In Frederiksen, plaintiff purchased all the assets and
stock of a close corporation. 52 The seller sued in state court for breach
S. There are also a number of recent cases which do not appear to have considered
the question. Swen~n·v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980) involved the sale of
65 (out of 75 outstanding) shares of a corporation owning a hockey team to the team's
coach and his wife. Ttie sale of business doctrine apparently was not raised by the
parties. Although' the· court could have raised the issue on its own motion because the
issue involved its own jurisdiction to hear the case under .FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3), it
did not.
H 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
.
The Tenth Circuit had earlier adopted the sale of business doctrine in Chandler v.
Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977), all"g[1979 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 11 96,965 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 1975). The Chandler court held that the sale
of all the stock of a corporation owning a liquor store was not a transaction involving a
security. The agreement referred to the purchase of " 'described business and personal
property . . . called K.E.W. Inc. '.' .'!' and stated" 'PRICE TO INCLUDE: 100%
of the outstanding issued stock of K.E.W., .. .' .. The court held that the plaintiff was,
in substance, purchasing a liquor store and "incidentally, as an indicia of ownership,"
was receiving the stock. 691 F.2d at 444.
S2 The transaction was structured as a purchase of the corporate assets for $191,800,
to be paid as follows: 5160,000 to be paid into an escrow account to be used to pay all
existing debts of North Shore Marina, Inc. (NSM) and any unknown liabilities; the
balance of 531,800' was to be paid in equal monthly installments over a three-year
period beginning one year from the signing of the agreement. In addition, defendant
Poloway, the sole shareholder of NSM, sold 10% of the NSM stock to Emerald City
Corp. (ECC) for S10, and, for an additional 510, transferred his remaining 90% inter-
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of contract and fraud when his employment was terminated six months
after the sale. Defendants in the state action sued in federal court, asserting federal securities violations and pendent state law claims. The
district court dismissed the action, and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, on the ground that the transaction did not involve a
security.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the purchaser's argument for a literal
reading of the statute, and focused on whether the transaction was primarily for commercial or for investment purposes. Sl The court found
that the sale was a commercial transaction for two reasons. First, the
sale did not raise capital for corporate expansion, and was not, in Forman's language, "the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making
purposes."54 Rather, the sale of stock was used to vest the purchaser
with ownership of the business, similar to the method by which the
purchaser in Forman obtained living quarters. Accordingly, title to the
est to a voting trust controlled by plaintiff Frederiksen, the president of ECC. After all
the debts of NSM were paid out of the escrow account or earlier at the option of ECC,
NSM would payoff the balance of the funds to Poloway in redemption of his shares
held in the voting trust. There was also an agreement providing that ECC would employ Poloway for five years at an annual salary of $32,000, plus a consulting fee and a
20% sales commission, and a management agreement between ECC and NSM, giving
ECC management authority over the marina. 631 F.2d at 1149.
" In Forman, the Court emphasized that the purchasers of the housing cooperative's
stock were motivated by a desire to obtain low-cost housing, not a desire to make an
investment, since the stock did not pay dividends and could not appreciate in value.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 834, 851 (1975). This same distinction
between a commercial and an investment transaction has also been drawn in cases
involving the question of whether notes are securities. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-38 (2d Cir. 1976) for an analysis of the
various approaches taken by federal courts on this issue. Commentary on this subject
includes Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763
(1975); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities: A Review, 29 BUS.
LAW. 861 (1974); Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Coverage of Note Transactions:
The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567 (1980); Note, The Commercial Paper
Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 362 (1972); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note
is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973). The proposed Federal Securities
Code excludes from the definition of securities notes issued in a "primarily mercantile
or consumer, rather than investment, transaction not involving a distribution," 1 FED.
SEC. CODE § 202(150)(B)(iii) (1980), which the reporter says is the "least imperfect
solution to a troublesome problem." Id. § 202(200) .
.. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). On this basis
the Frederiksen court distinguished Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979), discussed in notes 78-83 and accompanying text infra.
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stock was passed "incidentally as an indicia of ownership of the business assets,"SS and the transaction was not a sale of securities.
Second, the court applied the investment contract test of Forman:
The 'economic reality' test for determining the existence of a security involves three elements: (1) an investment in a common venture; (2) premised on a reasonable expectation of profits; (3) to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.'·

The court found the first element of the test absent here because
there was no sharing or pooling of funds in a common venture. 57 The
court also found that defendant was no longer a participant in a joint
venture after the transaction, notwithstanding his employment agreement to receive a sales commission and his ownership of ninety percent
of the stock transferred to a voting trust controlled by plaintiff. More
important, the third element of the Forman test was lacking because
plaintiffs assumed management of the business and were not depending
on defendant's efforts to make a profit. The court rejected the assertion
that the employment agreement established plaintiffs' reliance on defendant's efforts, since as an employee defendant was not responsible
for those " 'essential managerial decisions' . . . affecting the conduct of
the business. "58 Indeed, the agreement specified that defendant was to
" Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981).
,. 637 F.2d at 1152. The court attributes the test to Forman, but as the Forman
court noted, the.test originated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The
difference in language from Howey, see text accompanying note 19 supra, is because of
the uncertainty as to whether the profits are to be derived "solely" or only "principally" or "significantly" from the efforts of others. The Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) followed the Ninth Circuit in SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973), by permitting some degree of investor participation in a non-essential part of
the business. The Koscot court stated, quoting from Glenn Turner, that "the critical
inquiry is 'whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise.' " SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 483; see also SEC v.
Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC,
103 S. Ct. 568 (1982); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d
875, 877 (lOth Cir. 1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir.
1973); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
" Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981), quoting Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir.
1977); see note 46 and accompanying text supra.
,. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981), quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.),
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operate under the policies established by the new owner. Accordingly,
under the investment contract analysis, there was no security here.

B.

Variations On a Theme: The Sale of Business Doctrine in the
Circuit Courts

In Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc.,s9 the Seventh Circuit made it clear
that the Frederiksen holding was not limited to purchases of corporate
assets along with stock. The court extended the doctrine to an acquisition solely of all the corporation's stock. On the other hand, in McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,60 the Seventh Circuit distinguished
Frederiksen. In McGrath, defendant purchased all of the stock from a
number of shareholders, including plaintiff McGrath, a minority shareholder and officer of the corporation. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
had made misrepresentations regarding plaintiff's continued employment which induced him to sell his stock and surrender a stock option.
The court found that plaintiff was an investor in the company and the
stock was therefore a security in his hands; the stock did not lose its
status as a security merely because all the holders transferred their
stock simultaneously.
In Sutter v. Groen ,6 I however, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered the
sale of business doctrine and reaffirmed it. 62 The court found additional
support for the doctrine in Weaver's holding that the bank certificate of
deposit was not a security because of the protection of the federal banking laws. 63 In the Seventh Circuit's view, the Supreme Court in Weaver
had clearly rejected a literal approach in favor of a pragmatic one. 64
Furthermore, the court determined that the 1934 Congress, which encert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see note 56 supra.
so 654 F .2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
• 0 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981) .
•, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff owned 70% of the stock of Happy Radio,
Inc. whose principal asset was a contract to purchase all the stock of Bret Broadcasting
Corp. from defendants over a twelve-year period and to manage Bret. Plaintiff alleged
that defendants overstated the corporation's earnings both to induce plaintiff to pay an
inflated price for the stock and to induce plaintiff to buy his 70% interest in Happy
Radio. The court stated that Happy Radio's purchase of all of the Bret stock fell
squarely within the sale of business doctrine.
62 The court felt reconsideration was appropriate in light of Marine Bank v.
Weaver, discussed in notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra, and Golden v.
Garafalo, discussed in notes 66-77 and accompanying text infra .
• J Apparently, the Seventh Circuit did not find relevant Weaver's analysis of the
profit-sharing agreement, since it did not discuss this part of the Weaver opinion.
•• The Seventh Circuit ignored the fact that some commercial instruments, though
"notes," have not been considered securities even by courts following a literal approach.
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acted the Exchange Act, intended by its use of the term "investor" to
exclude from protection the entrepreneur or the manager of a
business. 65
On the other hand, in Golden v. Garafalo,66 the Second Circuit considered and rejected the sale of business doctrine. Plaintiffs purchased a
ticket brokerage business from its sole shareholder. The lawyers for the
parties determined that the transaction should take the form of a sale of
all of the stock, because the corporation's lease on the business premises
contained a nonassignment clause. Although the stock was placed in
escrow as security for full payment of the purchase price, the parties
understood that the new owners had complete control over the business. 67 The court conceded that the transaction was squarely within the
sale of business doctrine if the doctrine were law in the Second Circuit,68 and acknowledged that the doctrine was not unreasonable,69 but
nevertheless rejected it.
The court first discussed the doctrine's "inherent elusiveness as a legal concept,"70 and noted that the doctrine requires an assessment of the
purchaser's intentions. Moreover, the court stated that problems also
arise in determining what constitutes a controlling block of stock. The
court also noted that the doctrine had even been extended to hold that
publicly traded stock might not be a security in certain circumstances. 71
Publicly traded stock, of course, had been thought since passage of the
Acts to be the quintessential security, subject not only to the antifraud
provisions of the Acts, but also to their other regulatory provisions. The
court felt that acceptance of the doctrine would only add to the difficulties of trial judges, requiring them to rule on subjective factual issues
simply to determine their own jurisdiction.
In reviewing Howey, Forman, and Weaver, the court determined
that the Howey investment contract test was applicable only for uncon6\ For this assertion the court relied principally on Berle and Means' 1932 work
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, "which made 'the separation of
[passive stock) ownership and [active managerial) control' in the modern corporation
. . . a rallying cry for reformers," and led to enactment of the federal securities laws.
687 F.2d at 201.
66 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
67 [d. at 1147 (facts taken from dissenting opinion of Lumbard, J.)
.. [d. at 1142. Indeed, the Second Circuit thought the doctrine, if it were good law at
all, was more clearly applicable in Golden than in Frederiksen. [d. at 1145.
6. [d. at 1140.
70 [d. at 1145.
71 [d. at 1142.
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ventional forms of securities,72 and the court accordingly decided to follow the literal approach. 7l Since the stock in Golden had all the conventional attributes of stock it was considered to be "stock" and
therefore was within the definition of a security. To do otherwise
would, in the court's view, conflict with the apparent congressional intent in listing such well-recognized instruments as stock, treasury stock,
and voting trust certificates, as well as catch-all phrases like "investment contracts" designed to cover unorthodox forms of securities. Had
Congress intended economic realities to be the sole test, the court reasoned, there would have been no purpose in specifying instruments
with established characteristics. 74
Finally, the court noted that rejection of the sale of business doctrine
would result in "a certain overbreadth in application,"75 whereby
courts would hear cases involving facts beyond "Congress' core concern
[which] was protection of the individual investor trading in public markets for shares of firms about which information is available only
through intermediaries.»76 However, the court recognized that overbreadth would exist even if the sale of business doctrine were adopted,
since it is present whenever persons in control of a corporation negotiate in face-to-face transactions. 77
" Id. at 1143. The court's analysis might be described as facile because the Supreme
Court precedent can be read both to support or reject the sale of business doctrine; see
text accompanying notes 17-49 supra.
71 The Second Circuit has consistently advocated literalism, see Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976); Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
" Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 1146.
,. Id.
77 The court stated:
So far as the anti-fraud policies of the Acts are concerned, the possibilities
of fraud and the ability to protect oneself through contract are the same as
to a 'passive' investor buying 30% of a corporation's shares from a sole
shareholder or an 'active' purchaser taking 100% and expecting to manage
it directly. So far as curing the overbreadth of the Act is concerned, therefore, the relevant distinction is between transactions in a public market for
stock and negotiated transactions involving close corporations, whether or
not they include transfers of control. We take it, however, that the Act was
always understood to apply to transactions in shares of close as well as
publicly held corporations and to negotiated as well as market sales and
purchases of shares. . . . Forman provides us no reason to reexamine that
understanding. If the Congress is dissatisfied with the present scope of the
Acts, we trust it will act accordingly.
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Prior to Garafalo, the only circuit which had read Forman narrowly
and rejected the sale of business doctrine was the Fourth Circuit, in
Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc. 78 The plaintiff purchased a one-half
interest in defendant corporation and became an officer. Subsequently
he discovered that the corporation's president had converted corporate
assets to his own use, leaving the corporation insolvent. The district
court relied on Forman and granted defendants' motion to disiniss because plaintiff was to contribute substantially to the management. The
substance of the transaction was therefore the sale of a half-interest in a
business, and not the sale of securities.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that because the statutory
definitions include stock as a security, there is a "strong presumption"79
that the statutes apply when a transaction involves stock. Accordingly,
the court stated that Forman required analysis of the Howey criteria
only when the stock involved did not have the "significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument."8o Moreover, the
court considered it irrelevant that the transaction <;ould have been structured in some other form. 81 The Fourth Circuit's holding in Coffin,
however, may be limited because the stock was sold in order to finance
expansion of the corporate business and, as the court noted, the transaction was a classic sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making
purposes. 82 The Seventh Circuit relies on this language to reconcile
Id. at 1146-47.
78 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), et:rt. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (t 979).
7. 596 F.2d at 1204. It seems this presumption would be rebutted upon a showing
that the instrument denominated "stock" had none, or merely a few, of the characteristics of the instruments commonly considered to be stock. See Slevin v. Pedersen Assocs.,
Inc., 540 F. Supp. 437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court rejected the argument that the
economic realities of an arrangement called an "investment contract" could not' be examined after the Second Circuit's opinion in Golden: "A lizard with a sign. around its
neck reading 'dog' does not change the lizard into a Labrador retriever."
.0 "Absent some showing that ordinary corporate· stocks are other than what they
appear to be, we need not consider whether an investor will derive his profit partly
from his .own efforts." Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (t 979).
81 "The parties in· this case chose to implement their plan for. joint ownership by
means of a stock transfer rather than a partnership agreement or a sale of assets. Having decided to deal in stock, they brought their transactions under the provisions of the
federal securities statutes." Id.
82 "The transaction appears to be the very sort of transfer with which the federal
securities laws are most concerned: 'the sale of securities to raise capital for profitmaking purposes.''' Id., quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
849 (t 975).
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Coffin with its own decisions. 8 ]
C.

Problems in Application of the Doctrine

1. Must All the Stock Be Transferred?
Since the essence of the sale of business doctrine is economic realities,
the courts agree that individual transactions must be examined to ascertain if a security was involved. This approach, from the point of view
of its adherents, rejects simplistic literalism and focuses on the purpose
of the transaction and the intentions of the parties. 84 According to its
critics, however, the sale of business doctrine adds complexity and uncertainty to an already difficult area of law. 8s
Most of the cases in which the doctrine has been applied involved the
sale of all the stock of an ongoing business; the purchaser subsequently
brought an action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-5, alleging fraudulent misstatements or omissions in the negotiations. 86 Even the proponents of the doctrine, however, acknowledge that
a sale of all the stock is not always outside the scope of federal securities regulation. 87 For example, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the
doctrine in McGrath when the plaintiff was a minority shareholder
who along with the other shareholders sold his stock. on the basis of
false statements made to him about his future in the business. 88 The
court reasoned that plaintiff was realistically an investor in the business
and that defendant did not immunize its fraud by purchasing all the
stock simultaneously.89 Nevertheless, had the purchaser of all the stock
See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 1981); Frederiksen
. v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981) .
• 4 Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981) .
•, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (2d Cit. 1982).
• 6 See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son,
Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Crr. 1981); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981) .
• 7 King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982) .
•• McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
835 (1981) .
• 9 651 F.2d at 467-68 n.5. In contrast, when plaintiff intended to be a passive investor, but purchased a small percentage of the stock as part of a group, some of whose
members took over the management of the corporation, a state court found that plaintiff
did not purchase a security. (Alternatively, the court held that plaintiffs had waived
their claims and were estopped to assert them because of delay.) Kaiser v. Olson, 105
Ill. App. 3d 1008, 435 N.E.2d 113 (1982). However, if there were no affiliations between the minority shareholders and the controlling shareholders;. apart from the fact
.3
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in McGrath been the plaintiff, it is clear that his suit would have been
dismissed. Thus, application of the sale of business doctrine may turn
on which party to the transaction brings suit.
No case to date has involved the sale of all the stock from plaintiff to
the defendant. 90 Suppose plaintiff's business depended on a contract
from a third party, and defendant had advance knowledge that plaintiff's corporation would get the contract, but told plaintiff the contrary
and then bought the corporation's stock at a bargain price. Does
Frederiksen require dismissal of the suit?91 Or suppose plaintiff sold
the business to defendant on the basis of defendant's representation that
he would 'continue plaintiff's employment in the business. Should a result .different from that in' McGrath foJlow? The sale of business doctrine offers no clear answer to these questions. Because one may control
a' corporation with less than one hundred percent stock ownership, in
some cases with less than even fifty percent, the doctrine may be applicable when plaintiff purch.ases less than all the stock from defendant. 92
'.

I

that their stock was acquired' simultaneously, a court might find that the minority
shareholder;s purc.h~sed a security and the controlling shareholders did not. The SEC
takes the position that individuals who agree to acquire stock at the same time in a
private placement are members of a group for the purpose of the reporting requirementsunder § l~(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1976). 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d~5(b) (1982); see also notes 103-13 and accompanying text infra.
90 ·Indeed, sellers of stock in closely held.corporations have been more fortunate than
purchasers in escaping application of the ,sale of business doctrine to. bar their claims.
See McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
835 (1981); Stacey V. Charles J. Rcgers, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Bronstein V. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The only case in which a
.seller's claim; has bc;en dismissed:isBarsy V. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. 111.1981).
The Barsy court felt.strongly that the requisite jurisdictional connection with interstate
commerce ·was tc;nuoJ1s. [d.· at 955 n.4; see nctes 139-41 and accompanying text infra.
Stacey involved the sale of stock by plaintiffs, eight shareholders in two corporations,
back tc the corporaticns (in effect, to the sole remaining sharehclder). The shareholders
.were children of .ttIe deceased founder ·cf bothcorporaticns. The ccuI1 questioned
whether the Sixth Circuit would adopt .F~eriksen V. Pploway, but felt it need not
reach the question because the facts brcught the case within the McGrath excepticn to
the doctrine, see note 60 and accompanying ~ext supra, fcr simultaneous sales by minority shareholders .of substantially all .of the corporation's stock. Although the eight
shareholders may have owned sufficient stock to control the corporation, the ccurt ap. parently viewed them CiS passive investors. 542F. Supp. at 50.
91 Cf. Glick V. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1980) (defendant liable under Rule
10b-5 for misrepresenting value .of stock to plaintiff); Dupuy V. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005
. (5th Cir.) (defendant liable under Rule 10b-.5 for misrepresentaticns which induced
plaintiff to sell stock at low price), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
U A clear example .of this is Anchor-Darling Indus. v. Suczzo, 510 F. Supp. 659
(E.D. Pa. 1981), in which plaintiff purchased substantially all, but not all, .of the stock
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In determining the applicability of the doctrine, courts must ascertain
whether a controlling block of stock has been transferred, and the result, a jurisdictional holding, may differ as to sales of stock in the same
corporation by different persons.
Determining control in different contexts has been a difficult issue
for securities lawyers. 9l Control turns not only on the amount of stock
an individual owns, but also on how the balance of the stock is held.
One must also consider whatever arrangements, explicit or implicit,
that may exist among the shareholders for voting the stock and managing the business.
In Sutter v. Groen,94 the Seventh Circuit adopted a rebuttable presumption that an owner of more than fifty percent of a corporation's
common stock was an entrepreneur and not an investor, and therefore
is barred by the sale of business doctrine from bringing a securities
fraud claim. Because the owner would be able ordinarily to elect at
least a majority of the directors, he would be able to control all corpoof three corporations from the defendant and at the same time bought out the remaining shareholders, who were defendant's daughters and employees. The court applied
the sale of business doctrine .
., Under the Securities Act, public offerings of securities made by controlling persons
require registration if they are offered or sold through channels of interstate commerce
or the mails, Securities Act §§ 2(11), 4(1), 5; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1 1), 77d(1), 77(e)
(1976). Public offerings made by noncontrolling persons, however, need not be registered, Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1976). "Control" is not defined in the
statute, but is defined by the SEC as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise," 17 C.F.R. §
230.405(f) (1982). The House of Representatives Committee Report stated that the
"concept of control herein involved is not a narrow one, depending upon a mathematical formula of 51 percent of voting power, but is broadly defined to permit the provisions of the Act to become effective wherever the fact of control actually exists." H.R.
REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933). The SEC has consistently refused to give
advice to anyone seeking guidance as to whether he is a "controlling person," because
the answer involves factual questions which the staff is not in a position to resolve. SEC
Interpretative Release No. 33-6253, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,644 (1980).
A defendant's argument, in a criminal case, that the term "control" was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite was rejected in United States v. Wolfson, 269 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946
(1969). See generally 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 770-783 (2d ed. 1961); 5 L.
LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 2700-2708 (Supp. 1969).
The proposed Federal Securities Code establishes a rebuttable presumption that a
person who owns, or has the power to vote more than 25 percent of the outstanding
voting securities (or owns more than 25 percent of total equity if the company has no
voting securities), controls the company. 1 FED. SEC. CODE § 202(29)(8) (1980) .
•• 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
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rate decisions other than those requiring approval by more than a majority vote of the shareholders.
The owner may argue that since the degree to which someone who
owns fifty percent or less controls the corporation does depend on the
distribution of the remaining shares, the party asserting the sale of business doctrine should have to establish that the shareholder controls the
corporation. The Sutter court, however, specifically left the issue open
for future consideration. 95
Transfers of fifty percent ownership have engendered diverse holdings as to the applicability of the sale of business doctrine. In Coffin,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the doctrine when plaintiff purchased onehalf of the stock. 96 In Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State
Bank,97 a derivative action charging various acts of alleged corporate
mismanagement, the doctrine was applied when an individual
purchased fifty percent of the stock from another shareholder on condition that the purchaser would resume control and management of the
corporation. 98 However, in the same case, when one person purchased a
note secured by fifty percent of the stock, there was a sale of a security,
95 Id. at 203. One court refused to apply the doctrine to the sale of 38% of a publicly
traded corporaiion, although it appears that court may reject the doctrine altogether.
Alna Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591,602 (S.D. Fla. 1982): "The
Court finds that the prohibition· of fraudulent securities transactions must apply to
large purchases as well as small purchases. Moreover, the limitation of the concept of a
security advocated by the Defendant is contrary to co~mon sense and normal
expectations. " .
•• Coffinv. Polishing Machs., Inc.,596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979). Frederiksen attempted to distinguish Collin by pointing out that the funds
derived from the sale of stock in Collin were to be used for corporate expansion.
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981). The Garafalo cOurt, on the other hand, found that the facts in Collin closely
resembled the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a partnership and looked less like
a' securities transaction than the transaction in Frederiksen. Golden v. Garafalo, 678
F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1982).
"
·97 513 F. Supp. 885 (~.D. Ill. 1981).
The court noted that in,Frederiksen v. Poloway, 687 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 .<t 981), the plaintiff was the person assuming control, while
in .Oakhill, the plaintiff was the corporation, but it saw no reason to distinguis~
Frederiksen on this' basis: "[TJo do so would require a determination that the same
transaction could be deemed as involving a security as to some of the parties thereto,
but not to others. The court declines to find that Fredriksen (sic) was intended to
spawn such anomalous results." Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State
Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885, 890 (N.D. Ill. 1981). In fact, as McGrath and Oakhill itself
(see text accompanying note 99 infra) illustrate, Frederiksen leads to precisely such
anomalous results.

:a

HeinOnline -- 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 351 1982-1983

352

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 16: 325

apparently because there was no evidence that this transaction was intended to confer responsibility for day-to-day operations on the
purchaser. 99
Finally, when all the stock was sold to a third party, a district court
applied the doctrine to dismiss a suit by the former fifty percent holder
against the former forty-two percent shareholder, which alleged that
defendant had received a better price for his stock than did plaintiff. loo
In contrast, another district court rejected the doctrine when plaintiff, a
one-third shareholder, sued his brother, another one-third shareholder,
alleging that his brother induced him to sell the stock to defendant for a
price below market value. lol Although both plaintiff and defendant
were officers and directors, defendant handled all financial matters and
plaintiff relied on him.102
2. Management of the Corporation: Actual, Joint, Delegated
The examination of control necessarily must be concerned not only
with percentage of stock ownership, but also with the actual management of the corporation. The courts consistently find that a seller who
continues to work for,.03 or signs a consulting agreement with the purchaser,.04 does not diminish the purchaser's control. This rule has been
applied even when the former owner continues negotiations on a key
government contract. IOS These findings seem correct, since it is apparent
that the new owners have taken over the actual operation of the business and are merely calling on the former owners to achieve an orderly
transition and thus maximize the purchased goodwill.
A closer case is Frederiksen,106 in which the new owner appeared to
be relying extensively on the efforts of the former owner in running the
business. The seller in Frederiksen entered a five-year employment
agreement to "assist, guide and give his expertise" in return for an
•• In addition, the court found that the terms of ,the note providing for accelerated
payment in the event Oakhill achieved a certain level of success, made the note an
investment and not a commercial transaction. Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v.
Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885, 892 (N.D. III. 1981).
100 Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. III. 1981).
101 Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
102 [d. at 926.
10) See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
10' See Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d 1139
(2d Cir. 1982).
10' See Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
106 Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981).
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annual salary, a consulting fee, and a twenty percent commission. The
commission agreement was similar to a profit-sharing arrangement,
which brought the transaction closer to the classic understanding of a
security. Nevertheless, the court noted that the contract provided that
the seller had to perform within "goals, guidelines, directives, policies
and procedures" set by the purchaser. Accordingly, the purchaser controlled the business. 107
Additional problems are created when it appears that there may be
joint control. The best example of this is Coffin, in which there were
two fifty percent stockholders, and one was president and the other was
vice president. The Fourth Circuit rejected the doctrine. loa Kane v.
Fischbach l09 provides another illustration of possible joint control. Defendant, the sole shareholder, transferred 155 of his 200 shares to a
partnership consisting of defendant and the two plaintiffs. The plaintiffs became the directors of the corporation, and one was president.
Defendant, now a 22~ percent shareholder, was executive vice president. The district court applied the sale of business doctrine to dismiss
the plaintiffs' suit.
Perhaps the most difficult problems arise when the purchaser is inexperienced or otherwise unwilling to run the business and delegates
control to another. His reliance on the efforts of a third party, for purposes of the Howey test,1I0 should place him within the protected class
of a purchaser of a security. However, because he retains ultimate, albeit theoretical, control by reason of his stock ownership, he may be
within the boundaries of the sale of business doctrine. Courts have fol107 The Go/den court found the holding in Frederiksen to be a questionable application of the sale of business doctrine. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir.
1982). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Frederiksen is strengthened by the fact that the so-called essential employee was fired within a year. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1137, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
See a/so Kasch Enter. v. Soren, No. 79-C-2661 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1981) (available on
LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file). In Kasch, defendants, the five former shareholders
of Globe Corporation, exchanged their Globe stock for redeemable preferred stock of
Kasch Enterprises. One of the defendants had an employment contract which entitled
him to a bonus of 121h% of net profits exceeding 52 million; plaintiff argued that his
efforts were essential to the business and that he had actual operational control. The
court refused to find an exception to the sale of business doctrine.
108 Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d -1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979).
109 [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1198,608 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
1982).
110 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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lowed the latter rationale. In Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc.;11
a corporation purchased all the stock of the direct and indirect subsidiaries of another corporation. The district court applied the sale of business doctrine even though the purchaser stated that it did not participate in the day-to-day management but instead relied on existing
management. In Somogyi v. Butler;12 the court said that because plaintiff had the right to exercise complete control over the business, whether
he chose to delegate management or operate it himself was irrelevant. III
3. Publicly Traded Corporations
Finally, although the doctrine originated

in

the context of closely

III 534 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982). Three months
after the district court decision in Seagrave, the Second Circuit rejected the sale of
business doctrine in Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), discussed in
notes 66-77 and accompanying text supra. The Second Circuit later reversed the district court decision in Seagrave "to give the district court a fair opportunity to decide
the issue in light of Golden . . . . " 696 F.2d at 228.
112 518 F. Supp. 970 (D.N.J. 1981). The facts were one step removed from the sale
of business doctrine since they involved the sale of assets and goodwill and the subsequent formation by the purchaser of a new corporation which received the assets from
the purchaser. Thus, it would stretch the limits of Rule 10b-5 itself to find that the
alleged fraud was "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. See note 3
supra.
III This view is consistent with cases involving purchasers of real estate who entered
into a management contract with the seller or a third party. The courts have refused to
find an investment contract under the Howey test, since the purchaser retains control
over the enterprise despite the delegation of management. See Commander's Palace
Park Assocs. v. Girard & Pastel Corp., 572 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1978); Schultz v. Dain
Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th
Cir. 1976). Although this approach is clearly consistent with Howey when the management contract is cancellable upon short notice as in Fargo Partners, it seems open to
question when the agreement is of longer duration, as in Schultz, because it then appears the purchaser is relying on the efforts of another. In Schultz and in Commander's
Palace Park the court found that the management arrangement was not offered by the
seller, and that therefore the arrangement did not constitute a security under Howey.
However, in Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981), the Fifth Circuit created a narrow exception to the general principle in a case
involving participants in real estate joint ventures. The court recognized that an investor may be incapable of exercising the control conferred upon him in an agreement.
When the investor is "so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he
is incapable of intelligently exercising his . . . venture powers . . . " 645 F.2d at 424,
he is forced to depend upon the promoter and thus, he has purchased a security. The
fact that the investor has delegated management is not sufficient to find the presence of
a security. [d. at 423. In Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), plaintiff, a
substantial investor in five real estate syndications, sued the promoter and other defendants. Although the agreements gave the investors substantial control over the property,
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held corporations, courts seem willing to extend it to purchases of stock
in publicly traded corporations. 11. This is a logical extension of the doctrine, considered by itself. However, because stock in publicly traded
corporations is the quintessential security under the federal securities
laws, anomalies in regulation may develop i'f this view is accepted. For
example, a tender offeror may argue that his offer for a controlling
block of a publicly traded corporation's stock is outside the scope of
tender offer regulation, since he is not offering to purchase a security.
While a court might avoid this untenable result by analysis of the relevant provisions of tender offer legislation,ll~ this example illustrates the
difficulties created by adopting Forman's "economic realities" as the
exclusive test for determining a security.

III.

ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR THE SALE OF BUSINESS DECISIONS

Use of the sale of business doctrine to bar plaintiffs from asserting
federal securities claims reflects several judicial concerns. First, many
courts believe that the transactions in question are purely local in character and impact, and that the cases therefore can more appropriately
plaintiff argued that his dependency on the defendants brought him within the Wi/liamson v. Tucker exception. The court held that allegations that plaintiff depended
upon the promoter's expertise precluded summary. judgment for the defendant-promoter, but affirmed the lower co~rt's grant of summary judgment for the other defendants. See a/so SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 103, S. Ct. 568 (1982).
'" Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, ~075 (N.D. Ill. 1981), states this explicitly.
However, the statement is dictum because the stock in question was that of Bally Distributing, then owned by three stockholders. Bally I?istributing was purchased by
Bally, a publicly held corporation. Cf. Alna Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Wagner, 532 F.
Supp. 591, 602 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (court found "no need to apply" sale of business
doctrine to sale of 38",0 of corporation's publicly t,raded stock).
liS Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976), regulates tender
offers for, inter alia, equity securities which are registered pursuant to § 12 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78/ (1976). Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (t 976), is a g~neral,antifraud provision, modelled after Rule 10b-5, which relates to all tender offers, and therefore to tender offe~ for all types of "securities." See
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 5.96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
\ 873 (1974). A court confronted ,by the argument set forth in the text could find that the
description of regulated securities in § 14(d) is specifi!=and unambiguous and therefore
is not controlled by the general definition of a security found in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(t0) (197-6). While the coverage of § 14(e) was clearly
intended to be broader than that of § 14(d), the argument can be made that the general
definition of security incorporating the sale of business exclusion is applicable in determining the scope of § 14(e) and therefore, a tender offer for a controlling block of stock
is not a tender offer for purposes of § 14(e).
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be resolved in state courtS. 116 Second, plaintiffs have often failed to state
federal securities claims adequately, leading courts to suspect that the
sole motivation for alleging those claims is to create a jurisdictional
predicate for bringing an action in federal court. 117 This fact, along
with the Supreme Court's admonition not to federalize the law of corporations, III has led the courts to use the sale of business doctrine to
dismiss the claims. Finally, courts may feel that these plaintiffs are in
some sense "unworthy" because these cases necessarily involve negotiated transactions rather than impersonal market transactions. Therefore, the plaintiffs could have and should have bargained for - and in
some cases did bargain for - whatever protection they needed. 119 The
sale of business doctrine, however, is unnecessary to rectify these concerns. To the extent these are appropriate concerns of the judiciary,
rather than policy decisions properly left to Congress, there are established bases within Rule lOb-5 case law for excluding such claims.
A.

Failure to State a Federal Securities Claim

Many of the decisions which rely on the sale of business doctrine to
defeat the plaintiff's claims could reach the same result on other
grounds. In Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc.,I2O the district court found
that plaintiff failed to establish any of the material elements for recovery under federal or state securities laws or under common-law fraud
rules. 121 The Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed dismissal of the securities claims l22 solely on the basis of Frederiksen v. Poloway,123 which
it had decided a few months earlier. It also appears that many of the
sale of business cases, had they gone to trial, would have resulted in
findings that defendants did not violate Rule lOb-5, either because they
did not make material misstatements or omissions,124 or because they
See notes 131-41 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 142-52 and accompanying text infra.
III Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); sec note 10 supra.
... See notes 153-64 and accompanying text infra.
\20 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
\2\ The findings of the district court are set forth, id. at 462. It specifically found no
misrepresentations, lack of materiality, lack of reliance, no scienter, and no damage
suffered. In addition it found that there was no sale of a security for purposes of federal
and state securities laws. Id. at 462-63.
\2, The court of appeals also upheld dismissal of the common-law fraud claim,
which involved the court's finding of no misrepresentation, scienter, reliance, causation
or damages. Id. at 466.
m 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
\24 See, e.g., Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
.. 6
\17
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did not act with the requisite scienter. 12S Accordingly, in those instances
it was unnecessary for the courts to use the sale of business doctrine.
Similarly, to state a Rule lOb-S claim plaintiff must show that there
was a purchase or salel26 and, in most instances, that he was a purchaser or a seller.127 In some of the sale of business cases, there was no
purchase or sale, and that would have been' a basis for dismissing those
complaints. For example, in Reprosystem v. SCM Corp.,128 the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that, after negotiations for the
purchase of defendant's foreign subsidiaries were concluded, defendant
decided not to proceed with the sale. The court found no' purchase or
sale and thus no basis for invoking Rule lOb-S.129 Other suits brought
by disappointed would-be purchasers have been dismissable on the
same grounds. 130
'" Sec, e.g., Reprosystem v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
126 Sec note 3 supra.
127 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1976), accepted the rule
of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952), that one must be a purchaser 'or seller of a security to have standing to
bring a Rule IOb-5 claim. The status of certain exceptions to the Birnbaum rule, which
had developed prior to Blue Chip Stamps, remains unresolved. The courts have, for
instance, continued to apply the "forced seller" exception, which confers standing on an
individual whose stock is involuntarily converted into a cash claim because of a merger
or liquidation consummated through fraud. Sec, e.g., Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372
(5th Cir. 1980); Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 954 (1977); Morales v. Gould Investors Trust, 445 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. '1978). See generally Gallagher, IOb-S After
Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1975); Jacobs,
Standing to Sue Under Rule IOb-S After Blue Chip Stamps, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 387
(1976).
'!' 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
'2' [d. at 1274. Compare Omega Executive Servs., Inc. v. Grant, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1196,848 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1979); Desser v. Ashton, '408 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'dmem.; 573 'F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977),
with Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 506 F. Supp.
944 (N.D. Ga. 1980). These cases explore the scope ~f another exception to ~he Birnbaum rule, sec note 127 supra, when one has a CQntractual right to purchase securities.
130 Sec Rollo y. Glynn, [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,650
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1982); Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 11 96,964 (D. Colo. May 13, 1977); see also Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F.
Supp. 970 (D.N.J. 1981) (plaintiff, purchaser of business' assets, alleged it was parties'
understanding that he would organize corporation to receive assets and issue stock to
him; court held that even if transaction constituted a purchase or sale, it was not "in
connection with" the sale of a security).
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Local Transactions

Some courts have made it clear that they do not believe the transaction is a federal concern. \31 This is not a new issue in Rule 10b-5 litigation. In the past, defendants persistently and unsuccessfully argued
that transactions involving close corporations, in which face-to-face negotiations were conducted, lacked the requisite connection with interstate commerce to invoke federal jurisdiction. m It was early established
that an interstate telephone call was a sufficient use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce to invoke federal securities jurisdiction. 1H It
appears now to be settled law that an intrastate telephone call over
lines which run interstate is sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. \34
.31 See, e.g., Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952,955 n.4, 956 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(finding letter and phone call within state was insufficient to meet the jurisdictional
requirement).
132 Section 10 of the Exchange Act requires the use "of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), set forth in note 3 supra.
III See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1960), rert. denied,
365 U.S. 870 (1961) .
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have expressly so held. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1975); Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar,
503 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), rert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Spilker v. Shayne Laboratories, Inc., 520 F.2d 523 (9th
Cir. 1975); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Barsy v.
Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 955 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Courts looked first at the explicit language of § 10 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78j (1976), set forth in note 3 supra, that is, instrumentality ofinterstate commerce, as
contrasted with the language of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976), that is,
instrumentality in interstate commerce. Dupuy, 511 F.2d at 642-43. Second, they determined that it was consistent with the legislative purpose to find a broad scope to
federal securities regulation:
[It) seems somewhat anomalous to assume, in the absence of express indication of such an intent, that on the one hand, Congress and the S.E.C.
meant to erect a comprehensive statutory scheme for the prevention of securities fraud, and on the other, intended to narrowly circumscribe its
scope of operation.
[d. at 643; "The bark of the Acts would be without substantially effective bite if we
construed 'instrumentality of interstate commerce' in the narrow and highly technical
fashion that the defendants urge." Spilker, 520 F.2d at 525-26. Moreover, this conclusion appears inescapable after the 1975 amendment to the Exchange Act's definition of
"interstate commerce" which added the following sentence: "The term ["interstate commerce") also includes intrastate use of (A) any facility of a national securities exchange
or of a telephone or other interstate means of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality." § 3(a)(17) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1976);
see S. REP. NO. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 149, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo &
• }<
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Furthermore, the mails are an independent basis for establishing jurisdiction. Therefore, a letter delivered through the mails, even if within
the same state, will suffice.135 In addition, courts have consistently held
that the misrepresentation or omission need not have been conveyed
through the instrumentality of interstate commerce or by the mails. It is
sufficient if the telephone call or the letter was "connected to"136 or was
"important"137 to the complained-of scheme. 138
Nevertheless, in reading the sale of business cases, one senses a great
deal of discomfort with this previously well-settled law. 139 Many of the
cases do involve very "local" deals, and some courts clearly feel that the
outer limits of Rule 10b-5 jurisdiction have been exceeded. 140 This feeling is intensified when the 10b-5 claims are given only cursory treatment by plaintiff's attorney l41 and appear to be only an excuse to get
into federal court. Indeed, one lesson of these cases may be that if
plaintiff's attorney does not take his own federal claim seriously,
neither will the courts.
C.

Inadequate Presentation of Federal Securities Claim

Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the circumstances constituting an alleged fraud l42 must be plead with specificAD. NEWS 179,268.
115 See, e.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Harrison v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 435 F. Supp. 281, 284 (W.O. Mich. 1977); Reube v.
Pharmacodynamics, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 900, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Levin v. Marder,
343 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (W.O. Pa. 1972).
13. Sp~lker v. Shayne Laboratories, Inc., 520 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 1975).
13' Gower v. Cohn, 643F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
III Indeed, it apparently suffices if the stock is paid for by check which clears
through interstate banking facilities. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
\l9 E.g., Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952, 955 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bula v. Mansfield, [t 979 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 96,964 (D. Colo. May 13,
1977). In contrast, the court in Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 931 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), noted in rejecting the sale of business doctrine that "it is well-settled that
section 1O(b) applies to face to face transactions between private individuals and outside:
the organized securities markets."
140 E.g., Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952,955 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
,
.41 Id. at 956 n.7.
I
.42 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court made
it clear that scienter was required to establish a violation of Rule 10b-5. Accordingly"
plaintiff must set out sufficient facts in his complaint to make a showing of scienter..
See, e.g., Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 169 (10th Cir.), cert. I
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). The circuit courts have consistently held that "reckless!
behavior" constitutes scienter for Rule 10b-5 purposes. E.g., Huddleston v. Herman &

I
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ity;4l or the complaint may be attacked by a motion to dismiss. 144 Rule
lOb-5 claims are a particular type of "fraud" and are sUbject to Rule
9(b). Therefore, conclusory allegations that the defendant's conduct violated Rule 10b-5 are insufficient. 145 This requirement eliminates frivolous suits,146 protects defendant's reputation,147 and apprises a defendant
of plaintiff's claim and of the acts constituting the alleged fraud. 148
Many plaintiffs apparently have failed to detail adequately the nature of the alleged fraudulent misstatements or omissions. 149 This may,
again, prompt the court to decide that the complaint is in actuality
founded on a state law contract or corporate claim. 150
Moreover, the judiciary's mistrust of the bona fides of the federal
claims is intensified when the substance of the complaint appears to be
a traditional state law claim, such as corporate mismanagement, which
the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 151 found not to
be fraud for Rule 10b-5 purposes. When the 10b-5 claim arises in the
context of a shareholders' derivative suit, courts have noted that the
shareholder is in reality complaining not that a fraud or deception was
perpetrated on the corporation,152 but that the officers and directors of
the corporation breached a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders.

D.

The "Unworthy Plaintiff"

One senses that in some of the sale of business doctrine cases the
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 1981), aH'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,
1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d
790, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1977).
'43 It is sufficient if plaintiff sets forth "averments describing the barebones of the
fraudulent scheme" as well as allegations that defendant used the mails or other instruments of interstate commerce. Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975).
". FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
'45 Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1971).
"6 Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1972).
'" [d.
"8 Felton v. Walston & Co., 508 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1974).
,,9 See, e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, ()37 F.2d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Kane v. Fischbach, [Current Developments) FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 11 98,608, at 92,987 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
15. Barsy v. Verin, 508 F. Supp. 952,956 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
'" 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977).
15' See, e.g., Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp.
885,889-91 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070,1074-75 n.6 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).
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judges simply do not believe that plaintiff should be entitled to recover
under Rule IOb-5. There is a tone of assumption of risk or even caveat
emptor in these opinions. Thus, the opinions mention that plaintiff was
an experienced businessman, or that he had access to corporate books
or records. 153 This approach is repugnant to the congressional purpose
and inconsistent with settled precedent. 154 The doctrine of due diligence
serves to weed out claims by plaintiffs whose conduct should render
them ineligible to recover. Due diligence recognizes that Rule IOb-5
should not recompense plaintiffs who have completely failed to look
after their own interests.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Dupuy v. D upuyl55 is the leading
case in this area. The trial court entered judgment for defendant, notwithstanding the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, because in its view
there was "no evidence from which a finder of fact might have inferred
any diligence on the part of the plaintiff."156 Defendant had purchased
a forty-seven percent interest in a corporation from plaintiff, his
brother, at a bargain price, intentionally misrepresenting the corporation's prospects. The Fifth Circuit held that the jury could properly
find that plaintiff had not acted carelessly and that, despite his failure
to investigate into the affairs of the corporation and his initiation of the
negotiations, plaintiff did not sell his stock in reckless disregard of the
corporation's prospects. The· court emphasized that plaintiff had been
cut out of participation in the business by his brother, that he had repeatedly discussed the corporation and the stock sale with his brother,
and that his ability to investigate was diminished by his need to find
new employment and by his ill health. 157
Analyzing due diligence, the court first reaffirmed its earlier view
that plaintiff's due diligence was an appropriate consideration in Rule
10b-5 cases, and accordingly should be considered as a separate element
IH See, e.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting).
'" See notes 162-63 infra.
'" 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), rert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). In an earlier decision, Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit reversed the
trial court's finding of insufficient connection with interstate commerce. The trial court
found that although the plaintiff and defendant lived in the same apartment complex
and shared a patio, many of the negotiations were conducted over the telephone. Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 375 F. Supp. 730, 731 (E.D. La. 1974). See notes 133-38 and accompanying
text supra.
IS. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1008 (5th Cir.), rert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
IS7 551 F.2d at 1020-23.
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of this claim. 158 The court then determined that plaintiffs conduct be
judged by a subjective standard to permit the fact finder to consider
relevant factors such as plaintiffs position in the industry, sophistication, and expertise in financial matters. 159 The court, however, re-examined the circuit's earlier rule, and determined that a finding of recklessness, and not negligence alone, would be required to bar plaintiff
from recovering. 160
The court reasoned that, because the Supreme Court's decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. HochfeJderl61 required scienter to establish defendant's liability under Rule 10b-5, it would be inappropriate to bar
plaintiffs recovery merely because of conduct on his part amounting to
no more than negligence. The court found further support for this position in general tort law principles: as between a defendant who acted
wrongfully intentionally and a plaintiff who acted wrongfully negligently, the plaintiff should win. In addition, the court noted that since
HochfeJder has dramatically reduced the scope of Rule 10b-5 liability,
the courts should not further do so by barring merely negligent plaintiffs from recovery. Thus, the Dupuy standard focused on whether the
plaintiff had "intentionally refused to investigate 'in disregard of a risk
known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware
of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.' "162 The Dupuy recklessness standard for plaintiffs conduct has
been accepted by all circuits that have considered the issue. 163
The court stated:
By considering independently whether the carelessness of a plaintiff
should preclude his recovery, the Court promotes two policies. First, general principles of equity suggest that only those who have pursued their
own interests with care and good faith should qualify for the judicially
created private 10b-5 remedies. . . . Second, by requiring plaintiffs to invest carefully, the Court promotes the anti-fraud policies of the Acts and
engenders stability in the markets.
[d. at 1014. As the court noted, due diligence can also be viewed as an aspect of reliance, another element of a Rule 10b-5 claim, in that reliance must be reasonable or
justifiable. [d. at 1015; see text accompanying notes 174-84 infra.
1!9 Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977).
160 551 F.2d at 1017-20.
161 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see note 142 supra.
162 Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977), quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (4th ed.
1971).
16) The Second Circuit has adopted the Dupuy reasoning, Mallis v. Bankers Trust
Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1980); the First Circuit has approved Dupuy's reasoning, Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 559 n.21 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Sundstrand
lSI
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In light of Dupuy and cases following it, two observations can be
made about the sale of business cases. First, the due diligence standard
is available and sufficient to eliminate truly unworthy plaintiffs. When
there are arms-length negotiations for the sale of a close corporation, it
is reasonable to suppose that the individuals will possess equal bargaining power, and that the purchaser will have access to corporate books
and records. Therefore, if the plaintiff examines the records and discovers evidence of fraud, but ignores. it, or if the plaintiff fails to review
the corporate records, he lacks due diligence, and his Rule 10b-S claim
should fail. 164 Second, plaintiffs whose claims survive HochfeJders requirement of scienter and who can show that they acted with the due
diligence required by Dupuy, can hardly be said to be unworthy.

E.

No Reliance or Causation

Reliance and causation are two further required elements which also
serve to reduce the scope of Rule 1Ob-S. 165 They are muddled concepts
in Rule 10b-S litigation. The starting point for any discussion of these
elements is the Supreme Court's opinion in ARiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States. 166 Defendants in that case included two employees of the
transfer agent for a corporation which held the assets of the Ute Indian
tribe available for distribution to mixed-blood members of the tribe.
The defendants fostered a secondary market in the stock by buying it
from the mixed-bloods and selling it to others. The Supreme Court
held that the defendants' failure to disclose the higher prices available
violated Rule 10b-S, stating that:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is. not a prerequisite to recovery. All that
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reaCorp. v. Sun Chein. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048-49 (7th Cir.), rert. denied, 434 U.S.
875 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692-95 (10th Cir. 1976), rert. denied,
430 U.S. 955 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976).
I •• But see Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (lOth Cir. 1976), rert. denied, 430
U.S. 955 (1977) (although plaintiff was a sophisticated insider with access to company
books, he relied on several intentional misrepresentations made by defendant about the
financial conditions of the corporation). The likelihood of plaintiff's conduct being
found to lack due diligence increases when there is no blood or close relationship between the parties, as there was in both Dupuy and Holdsworth, which fosters a reliance reasonable under the circumstances.
I.' "The element of reliance serves to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of Rule
10b-5 to those situations in which there exists causation in fact between the defendant's
act and the plaintiff's injury." Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88,"92
(2d Cir. 1981).
I •• 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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sonable investor might have considered them important in the making of
this decision. . . . This obligation to disclose and this withholding of material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.··'

The significance of this language has been widely debated. 168 It expressly applies only to nondisclosurel 69 cases, leaving open the role of
reliance in cases involving affirmative misrepresentations. 170 In addition,
the transactions in Affiliated Ute were face-to-face, leaving unanswered
its application in open market transactions. 171 Affiliated Ute does not,
•• , Id. at 153-54 .
• 68 Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule IOb-S: Scienter, Reliance, and
Plaintiffs Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REV. 653 (1975); Leech, Developments under Rule IOb-S and Section J6(b), 4 INST. ON SEC. REG. 375, 380
(1973); Stoll, Reliance as an Element in IOb-S Actions, 53 OR. L. REV. 169 (1974);
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule IOb-S, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975) .
••• However, in negotiated transactions, as opposed to market transactions, there
probably are few pure nondisclosure cases; more accurately, defendants failed to make
disclosures necessary under the circumstances to make the communications not misleading. The distinction between misrepresentations and omissions is not clear-cut. For example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the failure to
disclose that higher prices were available in the secondary market was also an implied
misrepresentation that the offered price was fair .
• 70 In Wilson 'I. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981),
cases involving misrepresentations were distinguished from nondisclosure cases. With
misrepresentations, reliance involves whether plaintiff believed what defendant said,
and whether this belief caused plaintiff's action. Thus, plaintiff must prove the misrepresentation was a "substantial factor" in his securities activities. See, e.g., Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1976). In
nondisclosure cases positive proof of reliance becomes difficult to show, and the issue
really becomes materiality. Wilson, 648 F.2d at 92 n.6.
17. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976); Ruder, Judicial Developments Under Rule IOb-S: Standing, Scienter, Reliance, Materiality and Implied Rights of Action, 7 INST. ON SEC. REG. 303, 323-28
(1976). In addition, a number of recent cases have accepted a theory of market reliance,
or "fraud on the market," when plaintiff did not read the document containing the
misrepresentations, but assertedly relied on the market to reflect accurately the value of
the stock. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 946 (1980). Cf. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (failure to read prospectus does not bar 10b-5 claim when allegation is that stock was unmarketable). See generally Anderson, Rule IOb-S: Recent
Developments, 12 INST. ON SEC. REG. 369,383-386 (1981); Note, The Fraud-on-the
Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
In an opinion vacated by the Supreme Court because of mootness, the Second Circuit
held that an investor who did not read an annual report containing the inaccurate
statements, but made the purchase after reading a newspaper article, can recover under
Rule 10b-5 on the theory that the article on which she relied would have presented the
company in a less favorable light had the annllal report been accurate, and that the
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however, eliminate the element of reliance from Rule 10b-5 cases. Instead, its holding is limited to one of two propositions: either that the
plaintiff's case should not be dismissed because of failure to introduce
affirmative evidence of reliance,172 or that the defendant carries the burden of proving that plaintiff did not rely. J73 Analysis of these complex
issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
Courts apparently will bar recovery if the alleged omissions or misrepresentations could not have affected plaintiff's decision to buy or sell
the securities. The court may find that the plaintiff did not rely on any
misrepresentation or omission,174 that the defendant's misrepresentation
or omission did not cause the plaintiff's injury, I7S or that the omission
or misrepresentation was not material to the plaintiff's investment decision.176 When the transaction involves face-to-face negotiations for the
purchase of a controlling block of stock in a close corporation, these
principles are available to deny recovery to plaintiffs who fully understood what they were doing. 177
misstatements affected the "integrity of the market." Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365
(2d Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
The Second Circuit, relying on Affiliated Ute, asserted that "UJust as a material misrepresentation or omission is presumed to affect the price of the stock, so it should be
presumed to affect the information "heard on the street" which led (the investor) to
make her losing investment." 663 F.2d at 368.
112 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECUIlmES REGULATION 1049 (5th ed. 1982).
173 Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 993 (1976). See Leech, note 168 supra, at 380.
114 Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 993 (1976).
'" 491 F.2d at 410.
176 Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1974).
177 The Seventh Circuit has stated:
It is not unlikely that the principal cause of concern about the increase
in this type of litigation is an assumption that it will always be much
easier to allege and. prove a lOb-5 case than a common law fraud case.
That assumption may not be warranted because it is not necessarily true
that the strict standards of disclosure which appropriately apply to transactions in which there is a dramatic disparity in the parties' access to material information will automatically and totally apply to negotiated transactions in which the parties typically rely on contract warranties and preclosing inspection or audits as a basis for the investment decision. A flexible statute which emphasizes the relevance of the context in which a
transaction takes place should neither limit its protection to an arbitrarily
defined class of purchasers and sellers, nor arbitrarily assume that every
purchaser and every seller is entitled to precisely the same disclosure.
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 660 n.28 (7th Cir. 1973),
rert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). Although the Eason court rejected the buyer-seller
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Thus, in Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen,118 plaintiff alleged that defendant made false and misleading statements and failed to disclose material facts in connection with negotiations leading to plaintiff's acquisition of four companies owned by defendant. In affirming the district
court's dismissal of the complaint, the Second Circuit noted that plaintiff's decision to acquire the business was not based on two memoranda
presented to the plaintiff in the discussions prior to the sale. Rather,
plaintiff made the acquisition because the companies fitted into its expansion plans. The district judge had found that "these broad considerations, rather than interstitial details of client lists or of immediate data
processing capacity, sparked Titan's acquisition interest."'79 Furthermore, the district court emphasized the relative position of the parties,
the arms-length nature of the negotiations, and plaintiff's opportunities
to examine and investigate defendant's companies. The Second Circuit
added that defendant's omissions were not material, given the
circumstances. 180.
Similarly, in Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. v. Bollo,'81 the Second
Circuit affirmed a judgment for 'the defendant, who sold a controlling
interest in an aircraft equipment corporation. The purchaser, an owner
of a commercial airline and a sophisticated investor, had unrestricted
access to the business data upon which it based its investment decision,
and had made a detailed review of the company's operations. In addition to finding no material misstatements or omissions, the district court
found that the acquisition was motivated by long-range investment
objectives and was based on plaintiff's own knowledge of the corporation and of the airline business. 182
requirement of Birnbaum, see note 127 supra, its reasoning is applicable here because
it emphasized a flexible construction of the statute, in contrast to the arbitrary and
automatic bar imposed on plaintiffs by use of the sale of business doctrine.
'18 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), rert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
'19 513 F.2d at 238.
180 Id. at 239; see also Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir.),
rert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974>. (plaintiffs, who sold their stock back to the corporate
defendant, charged that defendant failed to disclose the stock's book value, which was
substantially greater than the purchase price: "This information, however, was readily
available to appellants who, although aware of its existence and availability, were simply uninterested.").
18. 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977) .
• 82 Id. at 1092. In Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977), the same court
said:
The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own errors of judgment. Such investors must, if they wish
to recover under federal law, investigate the information available to them
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Cases thus illustrate that the elements of Rule 10b-S - reliance and
causation, as well as materiality and due diligence - can be used flexibly by courts to assess the worthiness of. each case. The plaintiff's business acumen and bargaining power, familiarity with the actual business
operations, and access to financial records of the corporation, appropriately may be considered to determine whether plaintiff has established
a Rule 10b-S claim. Hence, the "potentially limitless thrust of Rule
10b-S"IB3 is in practice confined to cases in which courts can comfortably conclude that defendant's misconduct actually caused plaintiff
injury~ 184

IV.

SALE OF STOCK VERSUS SALE OF ASSETS

The preceding discussion demonstrates that many cases which have
been dismissed by the courts on sale of business grounds could more
properly be decided on other grounds. The principal argument for
adopting the sale of business doctrine, however, is that these sales of
ongoing businesses only happen to take the form of the sale of the corporation's stock by its shareholders.185 Courts reason that the transfer of
ownership of the business could also have been effected by a sale of the
corporation's assets. Or, if the original owner or owners of the business
with the care and prudence expected from people blessed with full access
to information.
[d. at 763. The discussion of reliance also relates to the due diligence issue, as the above
quotation from Hirsch illustrates, because the asserted reliance must be reasonable or
justifiable. See text accompanying notes 1SO-S9 supra. (Hirsch imposed a negligence
standard on the plaintiff. In this regard it has been modified by Mallis v. Bankers
Trust Co., 61S F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), art. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981), which
adopted the Dupuy recklessness standard; see note 163 supra.)
On the other hand, the Bo11o and Hirsch approach was criticized by the Fifth Circuit
in Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 120S (Sth Cir. 1973):
We should always be wary of holding that a purchaser of securities,
who deals with the corporate insider, could have found out omitted material facts by examining the corporate books or undertaking other extensive
investigations. To do so is to allow the insider to present prospective purchasers with a mountain of information which they cannot possibly digest
and excuse themselves from liability on the basis that they did not provide
the right answers because they were not asked the right questions.
[d. at 1208.
III Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, S13 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), art. denied, 423 U.S.
840 (197S).
18. S13 F.2d at 238-39.
lIS For expressions of this view, see King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (1 lth Cir.
1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 11S1-S2 (7th Cir.), art. denied,4S1
U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (1Oth Cir. 1977).
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had decided not to incorporate the business, but to conduct it in unincorporated form as a sole proprietorship or partnership, the sale of the
business presumably would not have triggered application of the federal
securities laws. \86 The argument concludes that since the substance of
the transaction is the same, availability of a federal claim should not
turn on the fortuitous selection of the method of sale or the form of
doing business. 187
This argument fails, however, because it ignores the significant dis- '
tinctions between sales of assets and sales of stock, and between corporations and unincorporated forms of doing business. The distinctions
are well recognized and relied upon by attorneysl88 to determine the
best methods of doing business and of transferring the business.
In comparing sales of assets with sales of stock, \89 the following can
.16 Although the Second Circuit rejected the sale of business doctrine in Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1982), the court did make this observation
about the facts in Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
An interest in a general partnership normally is not considered a security since,
under partnership law, each partner has a legal right to a voice in the management and
control of the business. See Hirsch v. du Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). However, when the partnership agreement
confers all management responsibility on certain partners, the interests of the nonman·
aging partners may be considered securities. See Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp.
898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 647, 485
P.2d 105, 108 (1971) ("The primary weakness of the Howey formula is that it has led
courts to analyse investment projects mechanically, based on a narrow concept of inves·
tor .participation."). A limited partnership interest, on the other hand, is considered a
security, since a limited partner does not have the right to exercise control. Hirsch, 396
F. Supp. at 1227·28.
117 See cases cited in note 185 supra. For the contrary view, see Coffin v. Polishing
Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979):
When ordinary corporate stock is involved in a transaction, we likewise
need not consider whether the parties could have structured their arrange·
~ent in some other form. The parties 'in this case chose to implement their
plan for joint ownership by means of a stock transfer rather than a part·
nership agreement or a sale of assets. Having decided to deal in stock, they
brought their transaction under the provisions of the federal securities
statutes.
[d. at 1204.
III E.g., Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678
F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); see note 202 infra.
"' A third method of acquiring a corporation'S business is by statutory merger. See
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW. §§ 901·907, 910 (McKinney Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 251·253, 259·262 (1974). Apart from the corporate formalities required by
the merger statutes and the merged corporation'S loss of its separate corporate entity,
the advantages and disadvantages of a merger are similar to those for a stock acquisi.
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be noted. The principal advantage of an asset sale is that the purchaser
can pick and choose which assets and which liabilities he wishes to
acquire. In a sale of stock, on the other hand, he acquires all the assets
of the corporation by operation of law, and, more significantly, all the
liabilities, known and unknown. 19o However extensive the purchaser's
pre-acquisition investigation, he may never be sure of what he has until
after he has it. 191 Thus, acquisition of all the stock is riskier than an
asset transfer. 192 Indeed, one commentator has stated that sales of all
the stock are "obvious instances of natural dependence by one party on
the other. for information affecting value" and therefore are appropriate
for application of Rule lOb-S. 19 )
Other distinctions between the forms of transfer are of practical importance in determining how to structure the transaction. Because the
sale of the stock effects the transfer of the entire business, it is a simpler
transfer that requires only a transfer of ownership of the stock certificates on the books of the corporation. 194 In contrast, the purchaser of
the corporate assets may have to perfect his title by preparing and filing
deeds for real property or by transferring title to automobiles and other
personalty, and thus may be subject to payment of local transfer, sales,
and recording taxes, hence making the transfer more time-consuming
tion. For an example of an acquisition accomplished through a merger because a 20%
shareholder resisted sale of his shares, see Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616
F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980). A merger triggers a right of appraisal for any dissenting
shareholders. See W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS § 8.2 (2d ed. 1981).
190 See A. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1-8 (3d ed. 1969);
J. MCGAFFEY, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 1-3 (4th ed. 1979); W.
PAINTER, note 189 supra, §§ 8.2-8.4; Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques
in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1200-02 (1957).
,91 This problem is particularly acute with the acquisition of a small business, because complete books and records may not have been kept and accounting statements
may not have been audited. See 1 J. HERZ & C. BALLER, BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS §
1.203a (2d ed. 1981).
,92 There are, however, doctrines which make the purchasers of the assets of a corporation liable either to the shareholders of the acquired corporation's business or to its
creditors. W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, §§ 8.2(d), 8.4.
19' 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 4.6, at 81 (1981).
In negotiating a stock purchase, attorneys for the buyers may seek protection for
their client by obtaining representations, warranties, and indemnification from the
seller. In addition, a portion of the consideration received for the stock may be placed in
escrow. J. MCGAFFEY, note 190 supra, at 2. Nevertheless, the seller's liability for the
corporate debts is secondary.
,.. W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, § 8.3.
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and expensive. 195 Moreover, if the corporation has valuable nonassignable contracts or leases, acquisition by stock transfer will usually be preferred. 196 Purchasers and sellers also will have to consider tax consequences of stock versus asset transactions. 197
Similarly, doing business in the corporate or the noncorporate form
can significantly affect the business. 198 The most notable distinction between corporations and unincorporated business entities is the availability of limited liability for the corporate form.199 Other significant
substantive distinctions include continuity of existence, centralized management, transferability of interests, and tax liability. 200 Still other distinctions relate to formalities of doing business. 201
The "incongruity" of having a Rule 10b-5 remedy available only
when the transaction is a stock transfer is thus no more incongruous
than the distinction between stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions, or
between corporate and noncorporate forms of business. The law will
not be simplified by treating the transactions as the same for Rule
10b-5 purposes by employing the sale of business doctrine. 202
'9' W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, §§ 8.2, 8.4; Darrell, note 190 supra, at 1199-1200.

,9.

W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, § 8.3; Darrell, note 190 supra, at 1199.
'97 The acquisitions discussed herein will be taxable transactions under the Internal
Revenue Code, since the purchaser is paying for the stock or assets with cash or property other than stock or securities. (If the purchaser were paying for the acquired property with stock, the securities laws would be applicable notwithstanding the sale of
business doctrine, Southeastern Waste Treatment v. Chern-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 506 F.
Supp. 944, 949 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1980), unless the exchange involved a controlling block
of stock on each side.) For the distinctions between a taxable purchase and a tax-free
reorganization, see B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11 14.04 at 14-12, 14-13 (4th ed. 1979). For an overview of the tax treatment of asset and stock purchases, see W. PAINTER, note 189
supra, § 8.5 at 419-22.
'9. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 2022 (5th ed. 1980); W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, §§ 1.1-1.5.
Attorneys can be found liable for malpractice for failing to explore with their clients
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of doing business. See
Haynsworth, Competent Counseling of Small Business Clients, 13 D.C. DAVIS L. REV.
399, 443-44(1980).
'99 See A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 1 (2d ed. 1977); W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, § 1.3.
200 See B. BITIKER & J. EUSTICE, note 197 supra, 111.07 at 1-25 to 1-28; W. CARY
& M. EISENBERG, note 198 supra, at 21-23; W. PAINTER, note 189 supra, §§ 1.3, 1.4.
20' See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, note 198 supra, at 26-38; W. PAINTER, note 189
supra, § 1.4 at 15-16.
202 Plaintiffs who have argued against the sale of business doctrine by claiming reliance on the protection afforded by coverage of the federal securities laws have not fared
well. In Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 678 F.2d
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CONCLUSION

The legislative history of the Exchange Act reveal,s little about the
congressional purpose or the intended scope of Section 1O(b). 20) Congress was principally concerned with transactions in securities on the
national securities exchanges and the over-the-counter markets. 204 N evertheless, the coverage of Section 10(b) explicitly includes securities not
registered on a national securities exchange,205 and thus it is apparent
that Congress intended Section 10(b) to extend beyond the organized
trading markets.206 Early judicial understanding 207 was that Rule 10b-5
applied both to face-to-face transactions, and to stock in close corpora1139 (2d Cir. 1982), the district judge said that the transaction had been negotiated by
able, experienced counsel who presumably should have been aware of the sale of business doctrine. In Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 378, 383
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 696 F.2d 227 (2d. Cir. 1982), the district court stated that "the
expectations, subjective intentions and motivations of parties do not determine whether.
the federal securities laws apply," thus contradicting the underlying rationale of the
Forman economic realities test.
203 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,201-204 (1976); 3 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1424 (2d ed. 1961). The legislative history of the Securities Act and
Exchange Act is compiled in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF '1934 O. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds.
1973).
204 The preamble of the Exchange Act states that its purpose is: "To provide for the
regulation of securities exchange and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair
practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes." Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; see also § 2 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78b (1976). This fact has been noted by the Supreme Court in United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). See note 21 supra.
205 See text of § lOb at note 3 supra.
206 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1466-67 (2d ed. 1961). Restricting § lO(b)
to the organized markets would be contrary to express congressional intent that the
comparable antifraud provision in the Securities Act, § t 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)
(1976), is applicable to securities issued in exempt transactions, including private offerings. 3 L. LOSS, supra, at 1466-67.
.
20' Many courts have used language expressing a broad purpose of the securities
laws. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that § lO(b) is not "limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets," but "must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Superintendent 'of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
12 (1971).
It has been said that "there is a strong federal interest, evidenced by the entire field
of federal securities regulation, in ensuring a proper flow of information between parties to a securities transaction." Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641,
646 (3d Cir. 1980). Since the Supreme Court decisions in Blue Chip, HochfcJder, and
Santa Fe, see note 10 supra, the rules have changed, and quoting this language in
future may amount only to a wistful retrospective.
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tions,208 and the Supreme Court in 1971 confirmed this view. 209
The sale of business doctrine has not been applied so far as to reverse completely this common understanding. Rather, within the class
of negotiated transactions involving stock in close corporations/ 10 it has
been used to exclude from federal securities regulation transactions
which transfer control of the business. Emphasis on the element of control enables courts to use the Howey investment contract tese 11 to exclude these transactions from coverage, but application of the Howey
test in this context seems an overly artful way to dodge explicit confrontations with what arguably may be the overbreadth of the securities
laws as currently written and understood. 212 It is not an appropriate
response to such a perceived problem to adopt the sale of business doctrine, a rule which by arbitrary means reduces the scope of federal securities legislation. Courts should be reluctant to invoke the sale of business doctrine to dismiss a complaint which specifically alleges an
intentional fraud.2J)
Arguments can be made that federal regulation of negotiated transactions or transactions involving close corporations is inappropriate. 214
Nevertheless, this determination is a fundamental issue of policy to be
decided by Congress, not by the courts. 2J5 To the extent Congress has
208 Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960); Frau
v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 959-61 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 830-31 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Additional cases may be found in 3 L. LOSS,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1467-68 n.83 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 3613 (1969).
209 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1971).
Superintendent was decided prior to the line of cases restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5
discussed in note 10 supra.
210 In dictum, at least one court has said that the doctrine is applicable to stock in
publicly traded corporations. See note 114 supra.
211 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
212 Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1982).
'" See, e.g., Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 868 (1979). The Seventh Circuit indicated its approval of Cof!in in Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
214 See Note, A New Approach to Rule 1Ob-5: Distinguishing the Close Corporation, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 733.
m But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)
("[I)t would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the [SEC) in
1942 foreordained the present state of the law . . . It is therefore proper that we consider, . . . policy considerations . . . . "). It should not be a sufficient objection that
plaintiff has a state-law remedy, because § 28(a) of the Exchange Act states that: "The
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appeared to consider the question, it has opted for broad coverage by
the securities laws. 216
It may be true that there are too many Rule lOb-S claims asserted on
flimsy grounds, and that this is the fault of attorneys who include Rule
10b-S claims solely to bring an action in federal court, attorneys who
have not taken seriously the message of HochfeJder and Santa Fe Industries, Inc.217 Accordingly, the courts should· act vigorously to discourage frivolous claims. First, claims that do not plead fraud with adequate specificity should be dismissed. 218 Second, courts should not
hesitate to impose costs and counsel fees if Rule 10b-S claims have been
raised frivolously219 or have been pursued after plaintiff's attorney
should have realized there was no adequate foundation for them. 220
The sale of business doctrine would, to a significant degree, eliminate
rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977) (in determining that a
defeated tender offeror lacks standing to sue under § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, the
court noted the availability of a remedy under state common law).
"6 See text accompanying notes 205-09 supra.
217 See note 10 supra.
.
211 See text accompanying notes 142-52 supra.
219 The courts have the power to impose fees when an action has been commenced
"in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." See F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rd. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,129 (1974); Nemeroff v.
Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980). For a finding of bad faith, "there must be
'clear evidenCe'· that the claims are 'entirely without color and made for reasons of
harassment or delay or for other improper purposes.''' Id. (emphasis in original). A
claim is colorable if "a reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting
the claim might be established, not whether such facts actually had been established."
Id. (emphasis in original). An attorney might escape a finding of bad faith, because
establishing scienter would require ascertaining the facts and circumstances of the
transaction and might necessitate a jury finding. However, a few egregious cases of bad
faith by plaintiff's attorney could be eliminated at the pleading stage, or after discovery.
220 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Costs and fees may also be imposed when the court
finds either "(a) . . . [the attorney's) conduct of the litigation was intentionally dilatory
[or) (b) [that at some) point during the litigation and prior to dismissal, sufficient facts
became available to [attorneys) to demonstrate that a failure to at that point withdraw
the action necessarily amounted to bad faith.'? Id.; see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d
339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980). On remand, in that case, the district court imposed counsel's
fees on plaintiff's attorney in the amount of S76,000. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 94 F.R.D.
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1.982). Noting that plaintiff's attorney conducted only five depositions in
a 13-month period, none of them of a party-defendant, and none of them advancing a
theory for recovery, the court said that "once [the attorney) learned that needed facts to
support the merits of plaintiff's claims had to be found without the anticipated [New
York Stock Exchange) assistance, he was obligated to concentrate all efforts on finding
a basis for continuing the case on the merits." Id. at 139.
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Rule 10b-5 remedies for fraud in face-to-face transactions involving
stock in close corporations. Use of the doctrine in these contexts is unnecessary, since correct application of already established Rule 10b-5
principles will result in decisions adverse to those plaintiffs asserting
unworthy claims. 221 The doctrine is also inappropriate, because it is
contrary to the apparent congressional intent in enacting the securities
laws. 222 Finally, the doctrine is ineffective, because in many cases there
will be issues of whether a security is involved that will require resolution at trial. m There is no reason in law or policy that the jurisdictional scope of the securities statutes should be manipulated to deprive
otherwise worthy plaintiffs of a federal forum and the protection those
statutes afford.
Thus, the sale of business doctrine, enunciated in Frederiksen v.
Polo way and followed by an alarming number of federal courts, is an
overly fadle and improper method for the courts to limit private causes
of action by purchasers of stock in closely held corporations. Judicial
desires to discourage frivolous claims can be accomplished as effectively
by correct application of existing Rule 10b-5 doctrine. There is nothing
in either the congressional intent behind the federal securities statutes,
or in the case law interpreting those statutes, that warrants the use of
the sale of business doctrine as a jurisdictional barrier between worthy
plaintiffs and federal courts.·

221
222

221

See notes 116-84 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 203-06 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 84-115 and accompanying text supra.
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